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The Rise of the Corporation,
the Birth of Public Relations, and
the Foundations of Modern Political Economy
Donald J. Smythe*
All contributions by corporations. . .for any political purpose
should be forbidden by law .... Not only should both the National
and... State Legislatures forbid .. . using the money of the corporation
in .. . any election, ... they should also forbid ... [its] ... use in connection
with any legislation ....
-President Theodore Roosevelti
[T]o exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of
the modern free economy. We should celebrate ...
the addition of this speech to the public debate.
-Associate Justice Anthony Scalia 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia's remarks from his concurring opinion in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission3 reflect a widespread modem acceptance of
the important role that corporations play in our economy, society, and every-
day life. As the quote from President Theodore Roosevelt suggests, however,
scarcely more than 100 years ago there was widespread skepticism about cor-
porations and their influence on American politics. 4 Roosevelt spoke in the
wake of the Great Merger Movement, a wave of industrial consolidations that
resulted in the largest discrete increase in industrial concentration in Ameri-5
can history. The Great Merger Movement had been possible because of
changes in corporate law in the late nineteenth century that allowed the con-
solidations to occur through incorporations under general state statutes and
because the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, had not
prevented it.6 It helped to reduce the risks that companies faced in making
significant investments in important new technologies and paved the way for
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.
I. President Theodore Roosevelt Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 5, 1905).
2. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. 130 S. Ct. 876.
4. See infra Part III.G.
5. It was notably larger than any of the subsequent merger waves. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part II.C.
635
Washburn Law Journal
the modem industrial economy of the twentieth century.7 But it was also the
final step in the emergence of a new era in American life, an era in which
large corporations played a central role in the economy and society.
Not coincidentally, President Roosevelt also spoke in the wake of a
campaign financing scandal, one that had impugned his own integrity.8  A
public inquiry into suspicious dealings in the insurance industry revealed that
large insurance corporations had surreptitiously made comparatively huge do-
nations directly into the campaign coffers of several politicians in the earl
1900s, including Roosevelt's in the presidential election campaign of 1904.
Roosevelt, no doubt, was stung by the revelations of the inquiry and wanted to
allay any concerns that he had been bought by corporate interests. But his
remarks went beyond the need for campaign finance reform and suggested the
need for more sweeping curbs on corporations' political influence. Indeed,
there was widespread alarm at the turn of the twentieth century about the
growing economic and political power of the corporations. Many worried
that corporate influences were subverting democracy and that the United
States was becoming plutocratic."
The economic and social transformation that began in the late nineteenth
century created a number of stresses and strains in American society. As the
nation made the transition from a rural, agrarian economy to an urban, indus-
trial one, many of the traditional nineteenth-century ways of life, and the Vic-
torian values that sustained them, were disrupted or challenged. Local com-
munities became less important, occupations became more professional, work
became more routine and hierarchical, racial and ethnic conflicts were height-
ened, and gender stereotypes came under attack.12 The changes and disrup-
tions wrought myriad strains of discontentment manifested among farmers,
the working class, the middle class, racial and ethnic minorities, and wom-
en.13 These strains of discontentment created pressures for reform that fueled
the Populist Movement in the late nineteenth century and the Progressive
Movement at the turn of the twentieth century. These political movements
created strains and divisions within the Democratic and Republican Parties
and contributed to an important political realignment during the period from
1896 to 1916. "
The explosive growth in the number of large corporations and the related
increase in market concentration that culminated in the Great Merger
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. Charles Evans Hughes, a future Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, headed the inquiry. Iron-
ically, Hughes was known primarily as a corporate attorney at the time. See infra Part 1I.H.
10. See infra Part III.G.
II. The word "plutocracy" was used commonly in newspaper and magazine articles to denounce the
political influence of the large corporations and their wealthiest stockholders. See infra Part III.G.
12. See infra Parts III.A-F.
13. See infra Parts ll.A-F.
14. This was arguably when the contours of the modem American political spectrum with a liberal
Democratic Party and a conservative Republican Party first began to emerge. See infra Part Ill.H.
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Movement at the turn of the twentieth century was an integral part of the eco-
nomic and social changes that disrupted late nineteenth century America and
drove the Progressive Movement. Although the Progressive Movement had
many impulses, its prevalent concern was about the growing economic and
political power of the "trusts." 15 The corporations themselves initially did
little to lessen those concerns and defuse reformist pressures. The ruthless
dealings of the "Robber Barons" in the late nineteenth century, and the "con-
spicuous" consumption of wealth industrialists at the turn of the twentieth
century, exacerbated the tensions. When the corporations' surreptitious at-
tempts to influence election outcomes with comparatively huge campaign
contributions were revealed, this only confirmed, for many people, that they
were a danger to democracy and strengthened the reformist pressures.17
At the turn of the twentieth century, corporate speech had no constitu-
tional protections. The First Amendment did not protect a corporation's
speech against the federal government, and the First Amendment had not been
incorporated to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the corpo-
ration's speech obviously had no federal constitutional protections against the
state governments. Moreover, there were no free speech rights under the
state constitutions for corporations. Corporations were regarded at the time as
creatures of state law whose rights and activities were controlled by their
charters. State courts could, and occasionally did, use the ultra vires doctrine
to construe corporations' charters so narrowly as to prohibit them from engag-
ing in certain kinds of speech.19 Indeed, as shareholder derivative suits be-
came more prevalent, the ultra vires doctrine could have inhibited many cor-
porations from making political contributions or engaging in other forms of
political speech. But that did not happen. Instead, courts increasingly de-
clined to apply the ultra vires doctrine and deferred to the decisions of corpo-
rate directors under the business judgment rule.20
Given the political pressures during the Progressive Era, it is striking that
corporate speech and related behavior was not subjected to much more severe
limitations. Some states did enact campaign finance laws that prohibited cor-
porate political contributions, and, in 1907, the federal government enacted
the Tillman Act to prohibit corporations from making direct campaign contri-
butions in federal elections, but it is not clear whether any of these measures
were very effective.21 The larger corporations soon came to understand that
the public's concerns could not be redressed simply by influencing particular
15. Indeed, many worried more about the corporations' political power than about monopoly pricing or
anti-competitive behavior. See infra Part Ill.G.
16. See infra Part V.A.
17. See infra Part III.H.
18. The U.S. Supreme Court's early treatment of the corporation's legal status was often muddled, but
the Court did not apply the First Amendment to corporate political speech until 1978, and it did not incorpo-
rate the First Amendment against the states until 1926. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.C.
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. See infra Part III.G.
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election outcomes. They faced a bigger problem: their public images.22 As
corporations learned that public opinion and public attitudes could be manipu-
lated, and that their public images could be repaired, they began to invest in
public relations programs. In the first half of the twentieth century, the mod-
em public relations industry was bom. American corporations sought not on-
ly to humanize their companies and integrate them into the American public's
sense of community but also to rationalize and legitimize the market system
within which they flourished, and inculcate into the public an ideology that
would institutionalize a role for the corporation.23
The public relations campaigns worked. Most Americans now probably
would agree that corporations are an integral part of a modem capitalist econ-
omy. Moreover, while many might not agree with Justice Scalia and the ma-
jority of the U.S. Supreme Court about how far corporate speech rights should
be extended, there is little, if any, public pressure for the kind of sweeping re-
strictions on corporate political activities that President Roosevelt suggested
in his Annual Address to Congress in 1905. The fact that the corporation
plays a central role in our modem economy and the fact that it has achieved
widespread social and political legitimacy are not unrelated. It was inevitable
that the central actor in our modem economy would seek some kind of social
acceptance and legitimacy. If the corporation had not achieved a significant
measure of social acceptance and legitimacy it probably would have been sub-
jected to much more restrictive regulations and it would not have become so
important to our economy. If courts and legislatures had not allowed corpora-
tions to engage in the kinds of speech that contributed to their public relations
campaigns in the early twentieth century, the American economy-and
American society-would have developed in fundamentally different ways.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the "Second Industrial
Revolution," a period of unprecedented growth and technological change in
American business that wrought related changes in the organization of busi-
ness firms and markets. Part III provides an overview of the Progressive
Movement, a loosely coordinated campaign for reform that resulted in part
from the dislocations and discontentment caused by the underlying economic
and social changes. Part IV elaborates on the corporate response, focusing
first on the legal preconditions and then elaborating on the rise of corporate
public relations programs and a corporate "welfare work" movement.
II. THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The period from 1870 to 1920 was a transitional period in American his-
22. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was said commonly that the corporation had "no pants to
kick or soul to damn." See Ray v. United States, 374 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1967). This reflected a concern
about the corporations' lack of a moral compass and sense of social responsibility and undermined the legiti-
macy of the corporation's role in American society. See infra Part IV.D.
23. See infra Parts IV.G-I.
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tory.24 It was during this time that electricity became the dominant source of
industrial power, the automobile first appeared on American roads, the high-
rise building appeared on the American city skyline, inexpensive, mass-
produced consumer goods became available across the country, occupations
such as law, medicine, engineering, and management began to acquire the
modem attributes of 3rofessions, and, perhaps most significantly, the modem
corporation emerged. These dramatic changes were a direct consequence of
the transportation revolution of the nineteenth century and myriad technologi-
cal innovations in its wake.26 The transformation touched every region of the
country, all racial, religious, and ethnic groups, and all levels of society. 27It
also had enormous implications for law, politics, and American culture.
A. The Transportation Revolution
The transportation revolution in the United States began with the con-
struction of a system of canals in the early nineteenth century.28 The canals
connected the interior of the North American continent to the important mar-
kets and shipping harbors on the coasts through the Great Lakes and the Mis-
sissippi River. The canal system left many parts of the continent outside of
the emerging transportation network, but with the advent of the railroad and in
the wake of major investments in new railroads during the middle and later
parts of the nineteenth century, the American transportation network became
truly national in scope.30 Although the railroads may have duplicated some
of the transportation capabilities of the canals, they augmented them in wa ys
and significantly reduced transportation costs in many parts of the country.
The construction of the canals and railroads and the development of a
national transportation network raised a number of problems for private inves-
tors and public officials. It also created many conflicts between the railroads
24. There are many ways in which the course of American history changed at the turn of the twentieth
century and many perspectives on the causes and consequences. For an overview of the economic changes,
see generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1977); THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM 1870-1970 (1989); DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1989). For alternative perspectives on the social
and political changes, see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); MICHAEL MCGERR,
A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920
(2003); ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967). For perspectives on the legal changes,
see generally MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988). For an interesting dis-
cussion of the impact of the corporation on American culture, see ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE
INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE (1982).
25. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 24 for an overview.
26. See generally CHANDLER, supra note 24.
27. MCGERR, supra note 24, at xiv-xv.
28. CHANDLER, supra note 24, at 34-36.
29. Id.
30. By the 1870s, the United States had a national transportation network. Id. at 88.
31. In fact, the railroads had so many advantages, that they began to replace the canals altogether. Id.
at 83.
2011] 639
Washburn Law Journal
and their employees and customers, which in turn added to the pressures on
private investors and public officials. 32  One of the early problems was that
competing railroads tended to make duplicative investments.33 In many cas-
es, a single railroad through some part of the country was highly lucrative;
this encouraged new railroads to invest in that region and compete for a share
of the profits. Unfortunately, in competing for railroad customers, the rail-
roads often undercut one another's prices after making large, fixed invest-
ments in new tracks and supporting facilities. 34 This pushed their prices be-
low average costs and they ended up not being able to cover their fixed
costs.35  The problem often motivated the railroads to consolidate and seek
respite from further competition. The consolidations, however, often resulted
in accusations that the railroads were charging monopoly prices.3 6
The railroad consolidations and accusations of monopolistic pricing
helped to foment the populist pressures that preceded the Progressive Move-
ment. 37 The Populist Movement was largely agrarian in its origins, driven by
farmers and other rural customers of the railroads who often felt aggrieved by
the railroads' allegedly anti-competitive behavior.38 Ultimately, progressive-
minded reformers, blue-collar workers, and unionists joined the farmers, and
the reformist pressures took on a broader scope and new directions.3 9  None-
theless, the early discontent with the railroads and the resulting pressures for
federal regulation to bring order to the railroad industry and to reduce the rail-
roads' monopoly power prompted Congress to enact the Interstate Commerce
Act in 1887. This was the first federal statute to regulate interstate
commerce. It was the harbinger of modem American business regulation.
32. See infra Part 11I.C. for a discussion of the Pullman strike, one of the most disruptive and violent
conflicts between management and labor in the nineteenth century, that virtually paralyzed the national rail-
road system. Farmers increasingly depended heavily on the railroads to ship their crops to distant markets,
and they often felt they were charged unfair rates. For a discussion of the farmers' discontent, see MCGERR,
supra note 24, at 104-07, 150-55.
33. See generally Michael Perelman, Fixed Capital, Railroad Economics, and the Critique of the Mar-
ket, 8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189 (1994).
34. See id. at 190.
35. See id. at 192-94.
36. See id at 193-94. Many sympathized, however, with the railroads. As Perelman observes, the
problems endemic to the railroad industry in the late-nineteenth century contributed to a new "corporatist"
school of political economy, which included some of the founding members of the American Eco-
nomic Association. Id.
37. The pressures for reform that began in the late nineteenth century unfolded in three distinct stages:
"the agrarian uprising that found its most intense expression in the Populism of the 1890's and the Bryan
campaign of 1896; the Progressive movement, which extended from about 1900 to 1914; and the New Deal,
whose dynamic phase was concentrated in a few years of the 1930's." HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 3.
38. Although many farmers felt aggrieved by the railroads' allegedly extortionate rates, and these
grievances no doubt contributed to Populist rhetoric, they may have been more imaginary than real. Id. at 58;
see also DOUGLAS C. NORTH, GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST 15-34 (1966). Hofstadter
attributes agrarian Populism to the transition that American agriculture was making from its self-sufficient
tradition to the commercial realities of the modern era. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 58-59.
39. See generally McGERR, supra note 24, at 3-76.
40. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 164.
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B. The Rise of Mass-Production Manufacturing
The development of a national transportation network had dramatic im-
plications for the American economy.4 1 The canals and railroads signifi-
cantly reduced transportation costs and opened up new opportunities for the
shipment of goods and travel of people well before the national transportation
42
network was complete. Manufacturing firms responded to the increase in
the size of their potential markets by expanding their productive capacity and
increasing their output levels.43  They began to invest in larger, more capital-
intensive J roduction facilities and to implement innovations in production
methods. Although most of the innovations were incremental, the cumula-
tive effects were significant, and manufacturing costs declined while manu-
facturing capacity exploded.45 In many industries, the new opportunities cre-
ated problems that were similar to those that were being experienced in the
railroad industry.46 Manufacturing firms made significant investments in new
capital facilities and then attempted to spread their fixed costs over a larger
output of goods.47 In many cases, however, they had to reduce their prices to
increase their sales. They often ended up engaging in vigorous price competi-
tion with other firms.48 In some cases, the price competition was so vigorous
that they were unable to cover their fixed costs. 49
Manufacturing firms typically responded to these competitive pressures
first by attempting to collude. 50  Generally, their attempts to collude failed.
In an industry characterized by rapid technological innovation, in which the
laggards tend to fail, firms' attempts to collude rarely succeed.5 1  In the face
of their inability to restrain competition through arms-length collusive agree-
ments, the firms generally turned to tighter forms of consolidation to alleviate
the competitive pressures.52 These initially took the form of trusts in which
41. It is not clear whether the railroads played a crucial role. Robert Fogel used a counterfactual econ-
ometric analysis to evaluate their impact and concluded they only marginally reduced the social cost of trans-
portation, given the existing networks of canals and rivers. See generally ROBERT W. FOGEL, RAILROADS
AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY (1964). Fogel's argument bucked
the conventional wisdom at the time he first made it, but it has largely prevailed today. See, e.g., Robert
Whaples, Where Is There Consensus Among Economic Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propo-
sitions, 55 J. ECON. HISTORY 139, 149 (1995).
42. Douglas North argues that railroad rates fell rapidly from 1865 to 1900. See NORTH, supra note 38,
at 137-42.
43. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904,
at 28 (1985).
44. Donald J. Smythe, A Schumpeterian View of the Great Merger Movement in American Manufactur-
ing, 4 CLIOMETRICA 141, 149-57 (2010).
45. Id.; see also LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 14-45.
46. Smythe, supra note 44, at 149-53.
47. LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 14-45.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In a series of lectures delivered at Massachusetts Institute of Technology after the turn of the twen-
tieth century, Justice Louis Brandeis observed that trusts typically attempted to restrain competition first
through cartels or trade association agreements. See THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 94-101
(1984). When these failed, they turned to tighter forms of cooperation and usually ended up merging. Id.
51. Smythe, supra note 44, at 146.
52. Id.
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competing firms would transfer their stock to a board of trustees who then
could control the firm's investment, pricing, and production decisions and re-
duce competition among them. 53 The trust device soon encountered legal ob-
stacles, however, and so firms sought to find some other mechanism for con-
trolling industry competition.5 4  Mergers were the only viable alternative.55
In the wake of new general incorporation laws in New Jersey and then Dela-
ware, scores of manufacturing firms consolidated in dozens of mergers during
the Great Merger Movement of 1895 to 1904.56 The mergers were typically
financed through the sale of stock in a holding corporation, which then used
the cash to buy out the parties to the consolidation.
The consolidations began in the 1880s, as many manufacturing firms
first faced new competitive pressures, but they increased rapidly toward the
turn of the century and reached a crescendo during the Great Merger Move-
ment.57 From 1895 to 1904, several hundred manufacturing firms were gob-
58bled up by more than 150 new consolidations. This was the most signifi-
cant discrete increase in industrial concentration in American history and the
consolidations reduced com etition in many industries. 59  They also caused
considerable consternation. The public's alarm was probably due in part to
the novelty of the trend. The consolidations gave birth to big business as we
know it today and thus inaugurated a new stage in American history. People
at the time were well aware that they were living through an important transi-
tional period.6 '
C. The Political Response to the Trust Problem
The public's concerns were initially motivated by the new corporations'
62
economic power. These new corporations were much larger than the firms
that had predominated during the nineteenth century when high transportation
costs largely precluded mass production.63 Their size usually translated into
significant market power, both in the markets for the goods they sold to their
customers and the markets in which they hired their employees. The public's
53. Id. at 153.
54. Id.
55. MCCRAW, supra note 50, at 96-97.
56. LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 1-2.
57. Smythe, supra note 44, at 153.
58. More than 1,800 firms disappeared in consolidations from 1895 to 1904. LAMOREAUX, supra
note 43, at 2.
59. The Great Merger Movement was significantly larger, relative to the size of the economy at the
time, than any of the subsequent merger waves in American history. Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J. White, A
Time-Series Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions in the U.S. Economy, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 273-75 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
60. Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the Foundations of Modern
American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 85, 87 (2005).
61. Smythe, supra note 44, at 149-53.
62. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1256, 1276-
77(1988).
63. See, e.g., LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 42-44 (documenting the significant increase in the size of
eastern newsprint mills in the relatively short period from 1892 to 1900).
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concerns about their market power placed significant pressure on political
64leaders to implement some kind of policy response. The common law did
regulate certain kinds of anti-competitive behavior, at least to certain degrees,
65but it proved inadequate to the task of regulating the trusts. Very few cases
were brought against the trusts under the common law and they had no appre-
66
ciable effect on their behavior.
Congress eventually responded by enacting the Sherman Act in 1890.67
This was another signal event in the federal government's assertion of its
powers to regulate business, but the Sherman Act proved to have little more
bite than the common law, at least for several years.68 The statute was not
drafted clearly and did not initially appear to proscribe any conduct that was
not already proscribed under the common law.69 The ambiguities may have
been intentional: the language may have reflected a compromise between
proponents of the statute, who were anxious to respond to the public pressures
for new restraints on the trusts, and opponents of the statute, who were con-
cerned about shackling the free enterprise system. The ambiguities meant that
the difficult task of defining federal antitrust law would be left to the courts.70
The first serious challenge to any trust under the Sherman Act was in a
suit brought by the federal government against the American Sugar Com-
pany. 71  The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that
the Sherman Act did not reach manufacturing activities conducted entirely
within a state because these activities were not a matter of interstate com-
merce.72 At the end of the nineteenth century, the federal government's regu-
latory powers were still severely circumscribed by the Court's narrow reading
of the interstate commerce clause. 73  By 1905, however, the Court had
adopted the "stream of commerce" doctrine, and the modern basis for the
federal government's regulatory powers was established. 74  Well-informed
64. Smythe, supra note 60, at 138.
65. For an overview of the English common law antecedents to the Sherman Act, see WILLIAM
LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 18-
52 (1965). By 1890, the common law limitations on monopoly had become quite weak. Id at 51.
66. Letwin observes:
It was true that in at least three prominent instances between 1887 and 1890 courts judging private
suits refused to uphold agreements in restraint of trade. Such results were comforting indications
of "the tendency of the judicial mind," as one contemporary law journal put it, but they were clear-
ly not enough to put an end to the trust problem.
Id. at 82.
67. This is the conventional view of Congress' motivations. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 62, at 1276-
77. Not everyone agrees. Werner Troesken, for instance, contends that the Sherman Act was motivated in
part by small businesses seeking protection from larger competitors. Werner Troesken, The Letters of John
Sherman and the Origins ofAntitrust, 15 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 275, 291 (2002).
68. The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in response to pressing concerns, but the first important anti-
trust case was not until United States v. E.C Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Smythe, supra note 60, at 98.
69. Id at 96-97.
70. See id
71. Id. at 98.
72. Id at 100-01.
73. Id at 100.
74. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used the term "current of commerce." Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U.S. 375, 399 (1905). Nonetheless, his opinion expanded the scope of federal interstate commerce pow-
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observers understood that this was an important development and would have
far-reaching implications. 7
D. A Technological Revolution and
the Birth of Modern Corporate Capitalism
The economic forces that drove the consolidations around the turn of the
twentieth century had other far-reaching effects. The new corporate behe-
moths made enormous investments in new plants and equipment that embod-
ied new technologies.76 Many of the new machines, for instance, were manu-
factured with "high-speed steel."77  This lighter, harder metal allowed
machines to be calibrated for more precise manufacturing standards. More-
over, because many of the firms' products were themselves manufactured
78
with high-speed steel, they were also lighter and more durable. The most
important technological development at the turn of the twentieth century,
however, was the supply of electricity through an alternating current.79
The supply of electricity through an alternating current helped electric
80power utilization diffuse much more widely among manufacturing firms.
Electricity not only proved to reduce their energy costs directly, it also helped
81to generate myriad other technological innovations. Under the "drive sys-
tem" that had prevailed with the use of steam and water power, for instance,
all the machines in a plant had to run at the same time. Because they all relied
on the same power source, they were operated through belts and pulleys that
limited the flexibility of their design. Electric power allowed individual
machines to run separately, and, with the advent of smaller electric motors, it
allowed the machines to be designed in ways that were better suited to their
ers. As he explained:
[C]ommerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from
the course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one state, with the expectation
that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another ... the current thus existing is a current of
commerce among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.
Id. at 398-99.
75. Smythe, supra note 60, at 129-30.
76. Smythe, supra note 44, at 149-53.
77. Id. at 149-50.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 150-51. It turned out that electricity could be transmitted much farther through an alternating
current than a direct current. Although the uses of electric power had been discovered and electric power had
been made available earlier in the nineteenth century, the shorter transmission capabilities of electricity sup-
plied through a direct current had limited its uses in manufacturing because it meant that if plants and equip-
ment were to be run on electricity they had to be constructed close to a major source of electric power. Id.
80. The diffusion of electric power utilization also may have been helped by the rise of big business.
To utilize electric power, manufacturing firms had to make significant investments in retooling existing
plants or entirely new plants. These investments were not only risky, they required financial capital. The
newly merged manufacturing corporations at the turn of the twentieth century, which could finance the in-
vestments through stock issues rather than through debt or retained earnings, and which generally had the
market power necessary to reduce the risks, may have accelerated the electrification of American industry.
See generally Donald J. Smythe, The Great Merger Movement and the Diffusion of Electric Power Utiliza-
tion in American Manufacturing, 1899-1909, 27 E. ECON. J. 253 (2001).
81. Smythe, supra note 44, at 150.
82. Id.
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purposes.83 The diffusion of electric power among manufacturing firms from
about 1890 to 1920 required firms to make significant investments in new
plants and equipment and to retool existing plants and equipment so that it
84
would not become obsolete.
There were many other important technological innovations around the
85turn of the twentieth century. These also required significant investments in
new plants and equipment. But the investments were often risky, especially if
they were made in highly competitive industries.86 Individual entrepreneurs
rarely had the personal wealth or the intestinal fortitude to undertake such
large investments on their own. The corporation offered a more secure and
effective means of raising the requisite capital and thus 4apears to have
played a key role in the dramatic economic transformation. The transfor-
mation was so significant and complete that it has come to be called the "Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution." Other developed economies underwent similar
transformations around the same time, but the United States emerged and re-
mained the world's technological leader through much of the twentieth cen-
tury.8 9
It would be difficult to assess what role the law played in the United
States' emergence as the world's technological leader. It is clear that the eco-
nomic forces that unleashed the Second Industrial Revolution were facilitated
and influenced by important changes in the law, especially corporate law. 90it
is also clear that the same forces had enormous social and political conse-
quences, and that they were facilitated and influenced by contemporary politi-
cal developments. 9 ' It is no coincidence that the Second Industrial Revolu-
tion coincided with the Progressive Movement. The turn of the twentieth
century not only featured the most important economic transformation in
American history; it was also the time of an important realignment in
American politics and society. 92
83. Id.
84. Id. at 150-51.
85. See generally HUGHES, supra note 24.
86. NATHAN ROSENBERG & L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., How THE WEST GREw RICH: THE ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 215 (1986).
87. As Rosenberg and Birdzell explained:
[Bletween 1880 and 1920, the United States was increasing its industrial capacity and altering
manufacturing technology in ways that required extensive replacement of obsolete plants, often
with plants of considerably greater size .... There was a serious need for new forms of enterprise
better able to attract capital .... [Tihe plausible expedients were ... incorporation, the formation
of trusts, and... mergers.... Although these produced many enterprises that failed, they also
produced a number of large enterprises that proved able[,] ... and a burgeoning American econ-
omy emerged from the merger movement ready to take off on a second industrial revolution.
Id at 215-16.
88. Id.
89. See generally Richard R. Nelson & Gavin Wright, The Rise and Fall of American Technological
Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1931 (1992).
90. See generally Smythe, supra note 60.
91. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 24.
92. Id
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III. THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
A. Agrarian Discontent
The social transition from a predominantly agricultural economy with
small and moderately sized family-owned manufacturing firms to a modem
industrial economy dominated by large corporations was not an easy one.
The late nineteenth century was a period during which many Americans grew
discontented with their lives and prospects as traditions began to clash with
emerging modem values. 93
The discontent manifested itself first among farmers.94 Although the
canals and railroads opened new markets for agricultural products, they also
opened up new opportunities for farming.95 Remote parts of the country be-
came accessible, and new farms sprouted up throughout the nineteenth cen-
96tury, especially in the Midwest. At the same time, technological innova-
tions were making the agricultural sector more productive.97 These
innovations were largely the result of better farm machinery and land im-
98
provements, such as irrigation systems. Nonetheless, credit was often diffi-
cult to negotiate and the real price of land rose throughout the period, making
99farming increasingly expensive.
The agrarian discontent that developed during the nineteenth century
may have owed something to the growing gulf between the agrarian myth of
idyllic individualism and egalitarianism that had become so deeply entrenched
in nineteenth century American culture and the grim commercial realities of
agrarian life.100  In the face of increased competition and rising costs,
93. See generally MCGERR, supra note 24, at 3-39.
94. Agrarian discontent fueled the Populist Movement, which preceded and ultimately was absorbed
into the Progressive Movement. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 46-51, 133; WIEBE, supra note 24, at
84-90.
95. As Hofstadter noted: "During the decade 1890-1900, in which ... [agrarian] discontent was most
acute, 1,100,000 new farms were settled, 500,000 more than the number in the previous decade."
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 52.
96. McGerr wrote:
Well into the nineteenth century, many farmers, distant from the market, had lived fairly self-
sufficient lives; they raised what they needed on their land, and bartered for much of the rest. By
1900, that self-sufficiency had largely ended. Whether they wanted to or not, most farmers now
produced cash crops for the market.
MCGERR, supra note 24, at 27.
97. "The rate of investment in farm machinery and implements increased rapidly from 1850 to 1880."
Wayne D. Rasmussen, The Impact of Technological Change on American Agriculture, 1862-1962, 22 J.
ECON. HIST. 578, 581 (1962).
98. Yair Mundlak, Economic Growth: Lessons from Two Centuries of American Agriculture, 43 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 989, 992-93 (2005).
99. Id. at 992.
100. Richard Hofstadter observed:
Writers like Thomas Jefferson ... admired the yeoman farmer not for his capacity to... make
money but for his honest industry, his independence, his frank spirit of equality .... The farmer
himself... was in fact inspired to make money, and such self-sufficiency as he actually had was
usually forced upon him ... . The more farming as a self-sufficient way of life was abandoned for
farming as a business, the more merit men found in what was being left behind.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 23-24.
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American farmers experienced decreases in their incomes and wealth. They
consequently felt less independent and life seemed less egalitarian. In short,
the gulf between the agrarian myth and the reality of their lives became more
pronounced.101 Moreover, with the advent of the railroads and the telegraph,
they were increasingly connected to the rest of American culture and they be-
gan to adopt its more commercial values.102 Because these new commercial
values came at a time when the farmers' incomes were declining and the ma-
terial quality of their lives was growing more difficult to sustain, they only
contributed to their dissatisfaction. 103
B. Urban Working Class Discontent
Between 1870 and 1900, young people migrated from rural areas to the
cities to work in plants, factories, mines, and other businesses.104  By 1900,
the United States had become a predominantly urban society and the agrarian
myth that had animated Thomas Jefferson's conception of democracy began
to fade from memory.105 The growing ranks of industrial workers became
more vocal about their own discontent. While they never may have aspired to
live the idyllic life of pastoral isolation and individualism that characterized
the agrarian myth, they had growing material wants and aspired for better
lives. 06 Many of the workers in the new factories were immigrants, espe-
cially in the larger cities such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.
They not only had to negotiate their way into the American workforce, they
often had to learn a new language and adjust to new customs and ways of liv-
ing. os Meantime, the industrial workplace itself was undergoing important
changes that increased tensions between the workers and industrialists.
Earlier in the nineteenth century, skilled tradesmen performed factory
109
work, and firms' production processes were small and non-routine. The
workers generally had some control over the pace of their work and manner in
which it was undertaken. 110  Certain customs and norms proliferated in
particular industries that derived from the trades and crafts of the workers that
101. Hofstadter wrote: "For the farmer it was bewildering, and irritating too, to think of the great con-
trast between the verbal deference paid him by almost everyone and the real status, the real economic posi-
tion, in which he found himself." Id. at 35.
102. See id. at 58-59.
103. See id.
104. The total amount of labor in farming continued increasing throughout the late nineteenth century,
peaking only in 1910. Mundlak, supra note 98, at 992. Young people frequently left their families' farms for
the cities. McGERR, supra note 24, at 32.
105. Id. at 30. The total population was obviously growing, so this explains how the proportion of labor
in agriculture could fall while the total amount of labor in agriculture was still rising.
106. Id at 13-21.
107. Id. at 33.
108. McGerr suggested that the ethnic diversity of the industrial working class impeded the growth of
the union movement. Id.
109. Id.
110. DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 17 (1979). As Montgomery explained,
craftsmen typically worked according to a "moral code" that helped to facilitate their cooperation with one
another. Id.
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were employed in them, and these customs and norms often regulated the
workplaces. As firms invested in larger, more capital-intensive facilities
near the turn of the century, they needed to assert more control over their pro-
duction processes and establish more clearly defined work routines.112 The
firms initially focused primarily on the control of production and increasing
the intensity of work effort. This emphasis on work effort defined what be-
came known as the "drive system" of production.1 13  Later, as firms adopted
increasingly sophisticated technologies, they also became interested in new
management techniques and began to implement the precepts of the scientific
management movement. 114
C. The Union Movement and Labor Strife
Industrial workers often responded to their employers' efforts to wrest
control of the workplace by seeking to organize. Their employers fre-
quently opposed their unionization and this often added to the tensions in the
industrial workplace. Nonetheless, the union movement grew in scope and
strength throughout the late nineteenth century. Unfortunately, so did strife
between the unions and their industrial employers.116 The Haymarket riot of
1886, for example, began after a period of upheaval in American labor rela-
tions and a rally in support of striking workers at a McCormick Harvestin
Co. plant in Chicago at which a number of workers were shot and killed.
At a rally organized in response to the incident the next day, an anarchist
threw a pipe bomb that killed a policeman.118 The police opened fire and at
least some workers responded with gunfire of their own. Several people died
and scores were injured.11 9 Although the incident contributed to the estab-
lishment of the first international May Day celebration,120 it was a setback for
the American union movement, and it was a reflection of the growing labor
tensions in America.121
The Pullman strike in 1894 brought labor tensions to a head.122 The
1 11. Id.
112. Id. at 113.
113. SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945, at 20 (1985). The "drive system" was
not always humane; the workers were sometimes subject to "abuse, profanity, and threats." Id.
114. The most notable figure in this trend was Frederick Winslow Taylor, the founder of the scientific
management movement. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 241; see generally JACOBY, supra note 113, at 29-
48.
115. The employers generally attempted to rationalize production by investing in further mechanization
and making the workers' tasks less skilled and more routine. DAVID M. GORDON, RICHARD EDWARDS, &
MICHAEL REICH, SEGMENTED WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS 113 (1982). "Much of this was resisted by labor
unions as an attempt to set up a system of paternalistic control, and much was indeed associated with a foster-
ing of company unions." HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 241.
116. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 119-20.
117. See generally JAMES GREEN, DEATH IN THE HAYMARKET 145-73 (2006).
118. Id. at l85-87.
119. Id. at 186.
120. Id. at 286.
121. Id. at 318-20.
122. The Pullman strike was "more extended and convulsive" than any of the previous ones in the late
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strike began after the Pullman Palace Car Co. had taken many of its workers
off straight wages and put them on a piece rate compensation scheme.12 3
Like many other American workers at the time, Pullman employees had been
pressing for an eight-hour day and regarded this as an attempt by the company
to squeeze even more work out of them. 124 In the wake of rising tensions,
most Pullman employees walked off the job and Pullman shut down its fac-
tory.125 The Pullman workers were soon joined by members of the American
Railway Union who, to show their solidarity with the Pullman workers, re-
fused to work on trains with Pullman cars.126 Because railroad workers
across the country refused to switch Pullman cars, the nation's railroad system
was paralyzed. 12 In the wake of growing unrest and fears of increasing vio-
lence, President Cleveland ordered the federal government to intervene and
ultimately ended the strike using federal troops. Although the strike prob-
ably damaged Pullman,129 it also did little to help the union movement. o It
was another signal event reflecting the growing malaise between industrial
workers and their employers at the turn of the twentieth century.
D. Middle Class Progressives
The ranks of the farmers and workers who were discontented with their
prospects in the emerging modem corporate economy were joined by growing
numbers of middle-class Americans, primarily from the ranks of small busi-
131
ness owners, professionals, and white-collar supervisors and managers.
These groups also felt threatened by the growing power of the trusts and often
worried that their social status was deteriorating in the emerging new eco-
nomic order.132 Small business owners, for instance, often struggled to
nineteenth century and serves as "our best window on law's interaction with capital and labor in industrializ-
ing America." DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND CAPITAL IN
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA, at xiii (1999).
123. Id. at 16.
124. Id.
125. Id at 18-19.
126. Id. at 24-25.
127. In quick order, almost 100,000 men were on strike and more than 20 railroads were tied up or shut
down altogether. Id at 26.
128. The strikers did not always relent without a fight, and dozens of men were killed in clashes with
federal troops across several states. Id. at 29-35.
129. A commission appointed by President Cleveland to investigate the strike described Pullman as
"unyielding" and suggested it might have been able to avert the strike if it had been willing to make conces-
sions. Id. at 83.
130. The commission appointed by President Cleveland also characterized some of the union's demands
as unreasonable. Id. at 99. The American labor movement never again was able to muster a general strike.
Id Some scholars have marked the Pullman strike as a turning point, after which the labor movement re-
treated from radical ambitions and set narrower goals. Id. at 98-99.
131. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 42-43.
132. Until about 1870, the small merchant, distinguished lawyer, or preacher was often a person of local
eminence. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 135. After that, their wealth and power were dwarfed increas-
ingly by the wealth and power of those who owned and managed the large corporations. Id. at 135-37.
Members of occupations with professional aspirations, such as law, medicine, and economics came to form a
"new" middle-class. WIEBE, supra note 24, at 112.
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compete with the large corporations and not infrequently failed.133 This then
pushed them into the labor market, and they sometimes ended up working in
the managerial ranks of larger businesses.134 Professions, such as law and
medicine, were undergoing changes of their own. Lawyers, for instance, in-
creasingly worked for the railroads or the manufacturing corporations, and
their traditional professional values often conflicted with the new demands on
their services. 13 Many felt that their practices were becoming more busi-
nesslike and that the standards of conduct and ethics in the legal profession
were deteriorating.136
Middle-class women occupied a unique place in late nineteenth century
America. They were generally neither beholden to employers for salaries or
wages, like many working class women, nor were they entirely independent
because of the role they were expected to play in the management and upkeep
of their homes. 137 Many middle-class women were well-educated and dissat-
isfied with their domestic roles.138 Many were dissatisfied with the middle-
class men to whom they were married, in many cases because of the Victorian
values and habits of their middle-class husbands.139 In some cases, women
avoided marriage because they feared becoming trapped in dull and meaning-
less lives of domesticity.140  It is no surprise, therefore, that middle-class
women were often at the forefront of reform. 141 Middle-class women in-
creasingly sought political and economic equality with men. 142 The suffra-
gette movement, for instance, was largely driven by middle-class women, and
younger middle-class women increasingly broke down the resistance of their
families and entered the workforce, often in white collar clerical jobs or teach-
ing.143 Sometimes the women even continued workin after they married,
although marriage usually meant the end of their careers.
E. Racial Division
The late nineteenth century was also a time of growing racial tensions
and violence. 145  At the turn of the twentieth century, ninety percent of
146African Americans lived in the South. More than thirty percent of the
133. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 54-55.
134. Id at 55.
135. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 157-59.
136. Id
137. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 45-46.
138. Id. at 47.
139. Id at 47-48.
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 52-53. This may have been partly because of the way in which prevailing stereotypes limited
women's opportunities. WIEBE, supra note 24, at 122. Social work was one of the occupations that com-
ported with the Victorian image of women as "tender mothers, angels of mercy, and keepers of the morals."
Id
142. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 52.
143. Id.
144. Id
145. Id. at 185.
146. Id
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Southern population was African American. 147 Increasing numbers of Afri-
can Americans had been born after the Emancipation Proclamation and never
had experienced slavery first-hand. There was talk among white southerners
of "New Negroes"-younger African Americans who they considered to be
less deferential than their parents and grandparents because they never had
been slaves. 148 There was a growing African-American middle class, com-
prised of business owners and professionals, whose manner of dress and life-
styles often irritated some poorer white people. 149
The confidence and success of the emerging African-American middle
class probably contributed to an increase in racism and violence against Afri-
can Americans in the late nineteenth century, particularly in the South.150
Many whites were among those disgusted by the violence.151 Nonetheless,
although some white progressive reformers did truly support complete social
and political equality for African Americans, the sad fact is that most progres-
sive reformers were racists who commonly thought that segregation was the
best answer to the nation's racial problems. 52 Many southern progressives at
the turn of the century continued to assert that the United States was a "white
man's country."1 53  It is no surprise, therefore, that the Pro ressive Move-
ment never had the enthusiastic support of African Americans.
F. A Growing Chorus
Although members of all these discontented groups hardly spoke with
one voice, many of the threads of late nineteenth century discontent found ex-
pression in a growing chorus of calls for reform. Because the Progressive
Movement was a product of all these diverse voices, this was reflected in the
many, sometimes conflicting, directions it took. Progressive reformers sought
to improve the lives of the poor through new forms of welfare, achieve greater
equality between the sexes by gaining voting rights for women, end the evils
wrought by alcohol consumption by ushering in prohibition, forestall the
growing divorce rate, and, most paradoxically of all, reduce racial tensions
and conflict by increasing racial segregation. 155  But even though the
Progressive Movement often took aim at social problems, such as alcoholism,
divorce, and racial violence, the main thrust of the Progressive Movement was
147. Id.
148. Id at 186.
149. Id.
150. Michael McGerr, for instance, recounted a racist diatribe by Sen. Benjamin Tillman on the floor of
the U.S. Senate in 1907. Id. The available data indicates that the number of lynchings across the nation rose
in the late nineteenth century, peaking at 230 in 1892. Id. at 187. African Americans were subjected to in-
creasing amounts of other forms of violence as well. Id. There was a resurgence of Jim Crow in the South
after the elections in 1896. WIEBE, supra note 24, at 107-10. In Wiebe's view, the "viciousness" of South-
erners' attacks reflected the failures of their communities. Id. at I 10.
151. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 187.
152. Id. at 187-94.
153. WIEBE, supra note 24, at 108.
154. McGERR, supra note 24, at 201-02.
155. See generally MCGERR, supra note 24, at 77-218.
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always to redress the rising power of the corporations and the growing dan-
gers of plutocracy. 156 At the turn of the twentieth century, the Progressive
Movement thus posed a challenge to the owners and managers of the new
corporations, one they scarcely could ignore.
The enormous wave of consolidations at the turn of the century no doubt
heightened concerns about big business and strengthened the Progressive
Movement. 157 Some of the concerns were obviously about the economic
power wielded by the corporations, because the consolidations caused a sig-
nificant and rather sudden increase in industrial concentration. 158 Moreover,
the Sherman Act had done little, if anything, to impede the merger wave nor
had the U.S. Supreme Court's early antitrust decisions. 159 Many worried that
the new corporations would abuse their market power by raising prices or im-
peding competitors.160 These were legitimate concerns, but they were hardly
the only concerns many progressives had about the consolidations and the rise
of big business. Many contemporaries, both progressives and otherwise, were
concerned about the sheer size of the new corporations and the threat that they
posed to American democracy.' 6 '
Louis D. Brandeis, for instance, who has been described as "[t]he most
influential critic of trusts during his generation," frequently railed against the
"curse of bigness."'162  Brandeis' aversion to the trusts may have derived in
some part from his own sense of social exclusion as well as his professional
experiences. Although he was a brilliant law student at Harvard, he was Jew-
ish and from the South, and he sought to make his career at a time in the le al
profession when social connections may have mattered more than ability.
Perhaps in part as a response to his sense of social alienation, when he gradu-
ated from law school, he formed a partnership with Samuel D. Warren, who
156. As Richard Hofstadter explained:
While Progressivism would have been impossible without the impetus given by certain social
grievances, it was not nearly so much the movement of any social class, or coalition of classes,
against a particular class or group as it was a rather widespread and remarkably good-natured ef-
fort of the greater part of society to achieve some not very clearly specified self-reformation. Its
general theme was the effort to restore a type of economic individualism and political democracy
that was widely believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed by the
great corporation and the corrupt political machine.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 5.
157. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 150-58.
158. LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 1-6.
159. The U.S. Supreme Court's early antitrust decisions actually may have caused the mergers. George
Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 77 (1985). But see
Smythe, supra note 60, at 96-131 (providing an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's early antitrust deci-
sions and concludes otherwise).
160. LAMOREAUX, supra note 43, at 159.
161. As Richard Hofstadter wrote:
The Progressive case against business organization was not confined to economic considera-
tions .... Still more widely felt was a fear founded in political realities-the fear that the great
business combinations, being the only centers of wealth and power, would be able to lord it over
all other interests and thus to put an end to traditional American democracy.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 225.
162. MCCRAw, supra note 50, at 82.
163. Id. at 82-85.
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had the social connections that he did not, and chose to focus on the practice
of law rather than moving in the right social circles.164 Although Brandeis
practiced commercial law, most of his clients were small- or moderate-sized
businesses-firms that generally competed with the large corporations. 165
His reputation as the "people's lawyer" and his aversion to the large corpora-
tions may have been a consequence, in part, of having represented clients
whose interests often conflicted with those of large corporations.1 66
Brandeis was hardly alone in his distrust of large corporations. The Pro-
gressive Movement fostered an era of "muckraking" journalism, a journalistic
genre that typically sought to illuminate the abuses and iniquities of big busi-
ness and draw attention to related social ills.167 Renowned writers, such as
Upton Sinclair and Ida Tarbell, contributed to a flood of glaring exposds of
168big business in the early twentieth century. Many of the muckraking arti-
cles also sought to expose political corruption. Numerous articles ex-
pressed concerns about the growing political influence of the trusts and the
dangers of plutocracy.170  There were frequent allegations that big business
was buying political influence through campaign contributions. In an article
published shortly after the election of 1900, William Jennings Bryan reflected
on the growing importance of fundraising in political campaigns and noted
that political contributions from corporations had become increasingly sig-
nificant-and biased in favor of the Republicans-since the election of
1896.171 Perhaps even more significantly, in a series of articles published in
164. Id. at 84-85.
165. Id. at 86-87.
166. Id. at 87.
167. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 185-96. As Hofstadter explained, from a journalistic perspective
there was nothing new about "muckraking." Id. at 186. What was new was the huge circulation of the mag-
azines and newspapers. Id Moreover, only a fraction of the journalism at the time was of this "muckraking"
type, and even that was not necessarily motivated by hostility towards big business. Id at 193.
168. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 157-58, 161-62.
169. With larger circulations, the newspapers became less tied to the political parties. HOFSTADTER,
supra note 24, at 188.
170. See, e.g., Plutocracy vs. Democracy: Millionaires in Office Endangering Our Republican Institu-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1890, at 14 (letter to the editor that asked, "Who can longer doubt... that the
present tendency is to the establishment of a plutocracy and the destruction of the democracy?"); Tending to
Plutocracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1892, at I (article reporting on former Sen. Thomas F. Bayard's warnings
about the growing dangers of plutocracy); WB. Hornblower on the Constitutions of 1795 and 1895, the Pub-
lic Service, and Centralizing Plutocracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1895, at 7 (article reporting comments made by
William B. Homblower of the New York bar: "There can be no doubt that the tendency of the present decade
is in the direction of the centralizing plutocracy."); Militarism and Plutocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1899, at 7
(article on the National Political and Social Conference in Buffalo in 1899 that debated an address to the pub-
lic on the "two great evils of militarism and plutocracy which now menace the existence of the Republic").
171. As Bryan explained:
[Ilt is worth while [sic] to consider why such large campaign funds are now used by Republi-
cans .... The magnitude of the fund which can be collected depends upon the interest which the
great corporations feel in the result, and upon the imminence of the danger to the privileges which
they are enjoying. Prior to 1896, the moneyed element of the country was divided between the
two leading parties; but, even then, the Republican party had a considerable majority among the
bankers, railroad magnates and manufacturers. In 1896, the Republican party secured the support
of practically all of those capitalists who thrive through governmental favoritism, or in the absence
of necessary restraining legislation . . .. Since 1896, the consolidation of wealth has gone on with
a rapidity never before known.
William Jennings Bryan, The Election of 1900, 170 N. AM. REv. 788, 791 (1900).
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Cosmopolitan in 1906, David Graham Phillips wrote a scathing expos6 of the
way big business had used its influence in the U.S. Senate to obstruct many
progressive reforms.1 72 Educated observers understood that the "trust prob-
lem" was not merely about the concentration of economic power; it was about
the concentration of political power in the hands of a wealthy class of corpo-
rate industrialists. 173
G. Legislative Reforms
The muckraking and other pressures did lead to some important reforms.
There was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of
1890.174 Some states had established agencies to regulate railroads long be-
fore the Interstate Commerce Commission was established,17 5 and others had
enacted their own antitrust laws and even filed suits a a nst combinations un-
der them well before the Sherman Act was enacted. By the turn of the
twentieth century, some states had tried to force the corporations to share their
wealth, in some cases by enacting corporate taxes and in others by enacting
laws requiring corporations to make local investments. 177 In 1903, the fed-
eral government created the U.S. Bureau of Corporations, which served to il-
luminate the role of the corporations without regulating them directly.1 78
And in the years following that, the federal government prosecuted high pro-
file antitrust cases against powerful corporate defendants, such as Northern
Securities Co. and Standard Oil Co. 179 In the wake of Sinclair's novel, The
Jungle, the federal government enacted The Pure Food and Drug Act in
1906. 180
Perhaps most significant of all-largely because it presaged the modem
debate about campaign finance reform-there was a wave of electoral reforms
at both the state and federal levels beginning in the late nineteenth century.181
Kentucky prohibited direct corporate campaign spending through an amend-
ment to its state constitution in 1891.182 By 1897, Florida, Missouri, Ne-
braska, and Tennessee also had prohibited direct corporate campaign spend-
ing.183 The trend continued well into the twentieth century, and by 1937,
thirty-eight states had restricted direct corporate campaign spending.1 The
federal government was not to be left out of the game. With the passage of
172. McGERR, supra note 24, at 175.
173. Id
174. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 164.
175. MCCRA, supra note 50, at 17-19.
176. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 153.
177. Id. at 154.
J 78. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 245.
179. See McGERR, supra note 24, at 157-59; Smythe, supra note 60, at 118-26.
180. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 160-64.
181. Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political Contribution Cases, 5
ELECTION L.J. 293, 293 n.l (2006).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id at 298 n.19.
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the Tillman Act in 1907, which also prohibited direct corporate cam aign
contributions, Congress enacted its first campaign finance reform law. 18
The impetus for electoral reform, particularly at the federal level, re-
ceived a significant boost from a scandal in the insurance industry that began
with a series of articles exposing the insurance companies' treatment of their
186
small shareholders and their ties to Wall Street's big financiers. A struggle
for control between two leading insurance magnates drew further bad
press.ls7 In response to growin ublic pressures, the New York State As-
sembly initiated an investigation. Charles Evans Hughes, then a corporate
attorney but eventually to be a Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, head-
ed the public inquiry. 89 Under Hughes' sharp questioning, insurance com-
pany executives revealed the high costs of their policies, the low dividend
payments for shareholders, their own huge salaries, and their attempts and
success at buying political influence in state governments.190 Perhaps most
damning of all, Hughes' interrogations uncovered the insurance companies'
secret contributions to President Roosevelt's campaign in the preceding presi-
dential election campaign of 1904.191
In candid testimony, Sen. Thomas Collier Platt (R-N.Y.) revealed not
only that he had received campaign contributions from insurance companies
but that he understood that such contributions put the recipient under a moral
obligation not to attack the interests of those who made them.192 Through the
hearings, the public discovered not only that Sen. Chauncey DePew (R-N.Y.)
received a retainer from the Equitable Life Insurance Company for serving on
its Board but that he had received a large loan from the company through a
real estate firm that he owned. 193 The insurance companies would have liked
to seize the chance to have the insurance industry regulated federally, rather
than by the states, but the push for federal regulation foundered, even though
it was supported by President Roosevelt. 194 Many states responded quickly,
195however, by imposing new state regulations.
185. Id. at 293 n.l (citing 34 Stat. 864 (Jan. 26, 1907)).
186. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 170.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 171.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 171-72.
191. Id. at 172. The public response was unequivocal and negative. An editorial in the New York Times
stated:
Considered from the point of view of public morality and public interest, the gift of this great sum
for use in a political campaign was an act so manifestly immoral and censurable that an attempt to
justify it or palliate it would quickly exhaust the resources of sophistry. And this condemnation
applies with just as much force to the contributions made in 1896 and 1900. It is, of course, no
part of the business of life insurance companies to take a hand in politics or to attempt by any
means whatever to sway the decision of the electorate.
The Campaign Fund Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1905, at 8.
192. McGERR, supra note 24, at 172; see also Campaign Funds and Moral Obligations, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1905, at 8.
193. McGERR, supra note 24, at 172.
194. Id. at 173.
195. Id. at 174.
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Congress responded to the scandal by enacting the Tillman Act, which
prohibited direct campaign contributions by corporations in national elections.
Not surprisingly, the Tillman Act had the full support of President Roosevelt,
whose reputation had been damaged by the public's discovery that he had re-
ceived significant campaign contributions from insurance companies in the
election of 1904.196 The Tillman Act, however, had more bark than bite.
While it prohibited corporations from making direct campaign contributions
in national elections, it did not prohibit or limit the officers of corporations
from making direct campaign contributions. Nor did it establish any agen-
cy or other body to oversee campaign contributions or investigate alleged vio-
lations.198 As a practical matter, therefore, it probably did little, if anything,
to reduce corporate political influences on elections. It did, however, respond
to the public's concerns and may have helped to alleviate pressures for more
efficacious reforms.
H. An Important Political Realignment
Some scholars argue that one of the Progressive Era's most enduring
legacies was to initiate a major realignment in American politics.199 Impor-
tant political developments during this period restructured the American po-
litical spectrum and framed the contours of political debates throughout the
twentieth century.200 It is always difficult to identify causality in politics, and
so it is impossible to know how much progressive pressures contributed to the
realignment as opposed to exogenous factors and happenstance. Regardless,
it is clear that the election of 1896 was a pivotal event. of It was fought in the
trough of a depression, and, as one would expect, the primary issue in the
196. See President Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1905). According to the
New York Times, the final version of the bill passed with little opposition. See To Bar Corporation Cash in
Campaigns: House Passes Gaines Bill with Little Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1907, at 6. Sen. Gaines
introduced the final version of the bill even though the statute has come to be called the Tillman Act. Id
197. As Herbert Alexander wrote:
Occasionally, corporate executives were given bonuses with the explicit understanding that the af-
tertax balance would be contributed to campaign funds. Some few executives were assigned to
work on campaigns while remaining on corporate payrolls. More often, slush funds were set up
under various facades, and money was secretly dispensed from them, frequently in cash, to candi-
dates. In general, the public did not know precisely what was going on, but the business execu-
tives and politicians did ....
Herbert E. Alexander, Corporate Political Behavior, in CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CRITICS: ISSUES AND
ANSWERS TO THE PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 34, 35 (Thornton Bradshaw & David
Vogel eds., 1981).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., SHELTON STROMQUIST, REINVENTING "THE PEOPLE": THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, THE
CLASS PROBLEM, AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LIBERALISM (2006); Thomas G. West, Progressivism and
the Transformation ofAmerican Government, in THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE 30 (John A. Marini & Ken Masugi eds., 2005).
200. Shelton Stromquist, for instance, argued that the Progressive Movement laid the foundations for
modem American liberalism, including its rejection of platforms and programs based on social class.
STROMQUIST, supra note 199. Thomas West concurred, contending that the theories of the Progressive
Movement, which rejected the principles of the "Founders' Constitution," provided the basis for the liberal
view that came to predominate after 1965. West, supra note 199 at 30.
201. See generally R. HAL WILLIAMS, REALIGNING AMERICA: MCKINLEY, BRYAN, AND THE
REMARKABLE ELECTION OF 1896 (2010).
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election campaigning was economic policy.202 Until the 1890s, the Democ-
ratic Party had adhered to traditional concepts of Jeffersonian democracy and
classical liberalism, such as free trade, a limited government, and a gold stan-
dard for money.203 Thus, Grover Cleveland, the sitting Democratic President,
had been elected on a platform that emphasized the gold standard and a sound
but tight money base, free trade, and private property rights.204 The Republi-
can Party, on the other hand, stood for protective tariffs, legislative interven-
tion to protect public morals, and, to a lesser degree, monetary expansion. 205
The severity of the depression in the 1890s contributed to pressures for
change within the Democratic Party. William Jennings Bryan and an assort-
ment of allies led an insurgency within the party in an attempt to alter its plat-
206form. They succeeded, and Bryan won the Democratic Party's nomination
207that year. He campaigned on a platform that promised to switch to a silver
standard, which would have meant a looser, more expansionary monetary pol-
icy, to curb the growing economic and political power of the trusts, and im-
plement other policies that would have encroached on private property. 208
The Republican Party platform adhered to the gold standard and the Party's
traditional support of protectionist tariffs. 209  Many Democrats, including
President Grover Cleveland, were unhappy about Bryan's nomination.21
Some, in fact, bolted the Democratic Party and formed a new party. The New
Democratic Party ("NDP") was thus born, if for only a short life. The NDP
stood for the traditional Democratic Party positions, including adherence to
the gold standard, free trade, and the rights of private property.
The NDP failed at the ballot box and did not seem to influence the out-
come of the election.212 Some Democrats may have feared that if they voted
for the NDP they would be throwing their votes away, because the real con-
213test was clearly between the Democrats and the Republicans. Some may
have been more averse to the Republicans' support of protectionism than they
were to the Democrats' support of freer money. Others simply may have
thought the election was not worth the bother of voting. In any case, the
Republicans won, and it does not appear that the NDP tilted the outcome in
their favor.2 14 Bryan, in the end, may have appeared too radical for a major-
ity of voters. The realignment within the Democratic Party, however, was
202. Id. at xii.
203. David T. Beito & Linda Royster Beito, Gold Democrats and the Decline of Classical Liberalism,
1896-1900, 4 INDEP. 555, 570 (2000).
204. Id. at 555-56.
205. Id at 557.
206. WILLIAMS, supra note 201, at 67-92.
207. Id
208. Id. at 102-09.
209. Id. at 139-43,
210. Id. at 67-74.
211. Id. at 110-128.
212. Beito & Beito, supra note 203, at 566.
213. The real choice was between voting for Palmer or McKinley or staying home. Id. at 566-67.
214. Id at 567.
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important, and it proved to be permanent.215 The Democratic Party never
again stood on a platform that so closely reflected principles of classical liber-
alism.216 The election of 1896 was arguably when the modem Democratic
Party was born, with a liberalism defined by a propensity to support govern-
ment intervention and regulation.
Presidential elections remained tumultuous throughout the Progressive
Era. In 1912 there was a schism within the Republican Party that was, in
many ways, redolent of the rift between Democrats in 1896. President
Theodore Roosevelt had tapped William Howard Taft to be his successor
within the Republican Party. Taft won the presidential election that year,
219but Roosevelt quickly became disenchanted with Taft's presidency. He
had the support of the progressive wing of the Party, and Taft emerged as the
leader of the conservative wing. Roosevelt challenged Taft for the Republi-
can nomination in the election of 1912, even though Taft was the sitting Pres-
ident. President Taft won the Republican nomination, with the support of
conservative Republicans, but Roosevelt and many progressive Republicans
were unhappy with the way the chairman had managed the convention and
220
were unwilling to rally behind him. Roosevelt and his progressive allies
formed the Progressive Party and ran against Taft and Woodrow Wilson, the
Democratic Party nominee, in the election of 1912.
The traditional Republican vote appears to have been split between the
Party's conservatives, who voted for Taft, and its progressives, who voted for
Roosevelt.221 Wilson was the clear winner, but Roosevelt won more popular
votes than Taft.222 Although Taft apprehended that he had little chance of
winning, he wanted to ensure that the Republican Party would remain com-
mitted to a conservative agenda.223 In 1916, when the Progressive Party
215. David and Linda Beito argued that the Democratic Party thereafter lost its support for principles of
classical liberalism. Id. at 568. Hal Williams argued that that the election shifted power in the Democratic
Party to the South and that the Democratic Party subsequently reflected the views of southern whites for sev-
eral decades. WILLIAMS, supra note 201, at 153.
216. Beito & Beito, supra note 203, at 568.
217. See JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS-THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED
THE COUNTRY I1-19 (2004). Roosevelt became more progressive after leaving office in 1908. Id. He was
therefore unhappy when he saw Taft courting the more conservative wing of the Republican Party. Id. Al-
though Presidents Roosevelt and Taft tried to repair the rift in the Republican Party, their efforts were to no
avail. Id. at 55-60.
218. Roosevelt worried that he would be blamed for foisting President Taft on the Party. Id at 19.
219. Roosevelt intentionally absented himself from the political scene while Taft began his first term in
office. Id. at 11-12. When Roosevelt was on his return from a trip abroad, he received a letter from Taft and
was immediately troubled. Id
220. Among other things, under Elihu Root's chairmanship of the convention, the Republican Party re-
fused to credential many of Roosevelt's supporters. Id. at 118-23.
221. Id. at 238-39.
222. Id. at 238.
223. In a September 1912 campaign speech, that sounded like it could have been delivered by Ronald
Reagan almost seventy years later, Taft said:
A National Government . . . cannot create good times. It cannot make the rain to fall, the sun to
shine, or the crops to grow, but it can, by pursuing a meddlesome policy, attempting to change
economic conditions, and frightening the investment of capital, prevent a prosperity and a revival
of business, which otherwise might have taken place.
Id. at 221-22.
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nominated Roosevelt for the presidential election, Roosevelt, to many of the
Progressive Party members' shock and dismay, declined the nomination. 224
Instead, he urged the Progressive Party to throw its support behind the Repub-
lican Party's nominee, Charles Evan Hughes, even though Roosevelt never
225had liked Hughes. Hughes declared that he was committed to progressiv-
ism, even though he had the backing of most conservative Republicans, such
as Taft, and that was enough to win Roosevelt's support, possibly in part be-
cause Roosevelt felt that the Democratic Party already had hijacked many of
the Progressive Party's ideas.226 The schism within the Republican Party that
manifested itself in the election of 1912 thus effectively ended in the election
of 1916. But the Republican Party emerged from the episode in its modem
guise, as the champion of conservatism rather than progressivism. The Pro-
gressive Party, in the meantime, all but died.227
Any concise summary of the complex developments and changes in
American politics during the Progressive era inevitably will prove simplistic.
Nonetheless, it is important to draw as many lessons from the period as possi-
ble, and we would be remiss not to attempt to at least limn the contours of the
most important changes. Given that heuristic purpose, and with the caveat in
mind, one might be emboldened to conjecture that between the presidential
elections of 1896 and 1916, the modem American political spectrum began to
congeal around a liberal Democratic Party and a conservative Republican Par-
ty. The Democratic Party never again adhered to principles of "classical lib-
eral ideas," such as individual liberty, freedom of trade, and freedom of con-
228tracts, and the Republican Party emerged from the period as the closer
allies, if not always the champions, of big business.229 Along the way, the
American Socialist Party peaked in popularity in 1912 and the American so-
cialist movement ebbed thereafter, never to factor into any important national
230
elections again. The radical strain of the Progressive Movement had been
eviscerated, and American politics was thereafter essentially centrist.
224. Id. at 252.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See generally Beito & Beito, supra note 203, at 568.
229. Even Theodore Roosevelt was at core a conservative, in spite of his tendency to rally around pro-
gressive causes.
Historians have long been aware how T.R., while enjoying the support and indeed even on occa-
sion whipping up the sentiments of the insurgent forces in American life, turned for advice in the
solution of his problems to the great conservative leaders in the Senate and to the great spokesmen
of Eastern industry and finance capital; and how much support he accepted for his campaigns from
the financial interests whose custodians these men always were.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 251.
230. Id at 238-39.
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IV. THE CORPORATION REINVENTS ITSELF
A. The Corporations Respond
At the turn of the twentieth century, the corporation occupied an impor-
tant, but insecure, place in American life. Many Americans were concerned
about the growing economic and political power of big business, and there
was a growing radical movement in American politics, centered around
231Eugene Debs and the Socialist Party. The movement also was reflected by
the strong support within the Democratic Party for William Jennings Bryan,
who was a product of the early Populist Movement and a strident critic of the
trusts.232 The movement even garnered support within the Republican Party
for Theodore Roosevelt, who may have been a conservative at heart, but who
carved a reputation for himself as a great "trust-buster" and was much less
friendly toward big business than many other prominent Republicans at the
time. Concerns about big business led to important federal and state regu-
latory reforms well before the end of the twentieth century.234 The Great
Merger Movement and a cacophony of muckraking newspaper and magazine
articles increased the resonance of calls for further checks on big business.
Some worried that the political power of the trusts was a threat to democracy
and that the United States was already on the road to plutocracy.235
Business leaders knew they needed to respond to the public's concerns
and forestall any new legislation that might curtail their opportunities or im-
pede business growth. Some business leaders learned during the Gilded
Age that arrogance or perceived indifference to the public good--even osten-
tatious lifestyles-might cause a public backlash and risk exposing their busi-
ness practices to closer scrutiny and regulation.237 As the twentieth century
dawned, the country's wealthy business owners generally exhibited much less
extravagance than the builders and scions of the great railroad fortunes had in
the nineteenth century.238 While this alone may not have repaired their public
images, at least they were doing them no further harm. But sophisticated
231. See CHACE, supra note 217, at 67-90, for a description of the "Debs Rebellion."
232. See generally Beito & Beito, supra note 203.
233. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 251.
234. See supra Part Ill.G.
235. William Jennings Bryan put the matter succinctly in 1900 when he wrote, "The issue presented in
the campaign of 1900 is the issue between plutocracy and democracy." William Jennings Bryan, The Issue in
the Presidential Campaign, 170 N. AM. REv. 753, 753 (1900). As he elaborated: "Surely, the rapid devel-
opment of plutocracy during the last few years will arouse the people to the dangers which threaten our Re-
public .... Corporate capital exerts an influence over government more potent than ever before." Id at 770.
236. ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 1-5 (1998).
237. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 4-6 (describing the public backlash against Cornelia Bradley Martin's
outrageously lavish costume ball in 1897). Thorstein Veblen famously lampooned the rich of the Gilded Era
and coined the term "conspicuous consumption" to describe their extravagances. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 68 (1899).
238. This was in response to some of the bad publicity their "conspicuous consumption" had generated.
See VEBLEN, supra note 237, at 68-101.
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business leaders increasingly knew it was not enough. Their concerns were
significant enough to overcome some of the typical impediments to collective
action and some important business interest groups were formed.239 The Na-
tional Civic Federation, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, and several similar pro-business groups were formed
between 1890 and World War I.240 These groups, however, did not speak
with one voice and often were divided internally over their strategies and ob-
jectives. 24 1
B. The Constitution and the Corporation
Until the Tillman Act in 1907, corporations routinely made significant
donations directly into the campaign funds of political candidates who sup-
ported the corporations' interests, or were at least less opposed to them than
the candidates' campaign opponents. The imbalance in corporate campaign
contributions was striking. In some elections, pro-business candidates re-
ceived several times the amount of funding of their campaign opponents. The
difference was invariably attributable to the disproportionate donations from
the candidates' corporate supporters.242 Direct campaign contributions may
have helped to elect William McKinley rather than William Jennings Bryan in
1896 and 1900 and Theodore Roosevelt rather than Bryan in 1904.24 The
contributions also may have helped to elect scores of pro-business politicians
to other federal and state offices. 44 When the size and nature of these contri-
butions became known to the public, however, there was a severe back-
245lash. Many felt that the contributions were immoral, and the public's
alarm about the growing dangers of plutocracy was heightened.24 Even
Roosevelt, who had won the presidential election of 1904 with significant
corporate donations, spoke out strongly in support of not only of the need for
limits on corporations' direct campaign contributions but also for limits on
corporate spending that might indirectly influence political outcomes. 247
Congress responded by enacting the Tillman Act in 1907. This only prohib-
ited direct corporate campaign contributions and, in any case, could be easily
circumvented.
Corporations at the time did not have any First Amendment rights to pro-
tect them from campaign spending limits under federal or state election laws.
239. Business interests were not always uniform. Moreover, sometimes corporate leaders preferred the
idea of relatively benign regulations administered by an agency they could influence to the rigors of competi-
tion. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 59-60 (2002).
240. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 257-58; WIEBE, supra note 24, at 123.
241. FRIEDMAN, supra note 239, at 59-60; SKLAR, supra note 24, at 16.
242. MCGERR, supra note 24, at 172, 174-78.
243. Id
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 175-76.
247. See supra note 1.
248. Alexander, supra note 197, at 35.
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Neither the First Amendment nor the concept of the corporation as a legal
person had been sufficiently defined by the U.S. Supreme Court for anyone to
be able to infer that corporations had constitutionally protected speech rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not apply the First Amendment to protect corpo-
rations against federal regulations until well into the twentieth century, and it
249did not incorporate the First Amendment to the states until 1925. It was
not clear that the Court would apply the Fourteenth Amendment to corpora-
tions until even later than that. Although many have interpreted County of
Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific R.R.250 in 1886 to impute personhood to the
corporation under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,251 the opinion itself does not actually refer to the legal personhood of
the corporation. In fact, the Court decided it did not want to address the mat-
ter. Many scholars, judges, and even U.S. Supreme Court Justices have erro-
neously interpreted the case as affirming the concept of corporate personhood
because of a headnote in the published version of the opinion, which actually
was written by the court reporter, J.C. Bancroft Davis.252 Because Davis was
exercising his own discretion as to what the Court's opinion stated, his head-
note had no precedential value, and it did not reflect a change in constitutional
. 253doctrine.
To add to the confusion, in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Mill-
ing Co. v. Pennsylvania,254 Justice Field in his majority opinion addressed
the scope of the word "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment and wrote
that "[u]nder the designation of a 'person' there is no doubt that a private cor-
poration is included." 255 Interestingly, in support of that position, Justice
Field quoted Justice Marshall's opinion in Providence Bank v. Billings,256
which stated: "The great object of an incorporation is to bestow the character
and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."25 7
But in that case, Justice Marshall was addressing whether a corporation
should be regarded as having any special freedoms from the usual burdens
placed on natural persons. His position was that they should not unless such
special privileges were stated in the corporations' charters. As he explained:
"Any privileges which may exempt it from the burthens [sic] common to in-
dividuals, do not flow necessarily from the charter, but must be expressed in
249. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
250. 118 U.S. 394 (1986).
251. SKLAR, supra note 24, at 49. Gregory Mark argued that many historians have erroneously attrib-
uted too much significance to Santa Clara. See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Cor-
poration in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1463 n.62 (1987).
252. Mark contends that the Court intended nothing more than to uphold its own precedents protecting
corporate property as property of the corporation's owners. Id. at 1463-64.
253. Id.
254. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
255. Id. at 189.
256. 29 U.S. 514 (1830).
257. Id. at 562. Justice Field slightly misquoted Justice Marshall as writing, "The great object of a cor-
poration is to bestow the character and properties of individuality on a collective and changing body of men."
Pembina Consol., 125 U.S. at 189.
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it, or they do not exist."258 This was consistent with Justice Marshall's long-
standing approach to the cororation. As he had written in Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodwardt5 9 in the first U.S. Supreme Court case address-
ing a corporate legal issue in 1819: "A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very exis-
tence." 260 As a matter of logic, it is quite consistent to think that a corpora-
tion bears all of the usual burdens of a natural person incidental to its creation
but not necessarily all of the usual rights of a natural person.
Justice Field clearly recognized that a corporation did not bear all the
rights of a natural person because he also wrote in Pembina that corporations
are not citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.261 Presumably, corporations had some of the rights of natural
persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but
not all of the rights of natural persons under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Because the Privileges and Immunities Clause has become virtually
irrelevant, it is not clear what Justice Field may have meant. Some scholars,
however, believe that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate the first eight-or perhaps even all
ten-articles of the Bill of Rights against the states. Justice Field appeared
to have accepted this view. As it turns out, the U.S. Supreme Court has
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment instead, but it seems likely that Justice Field would have denied
to the corporation many of the rights enjoyed by natural persons under the Bill
264
of Rights. Thus, in Minneapolis & Saint Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, when Jus-
tice Field acknowledged the "soundness of [the] position[ that corporations
are persons within the meaning of the clause in question," 2 and erroneously
258. Providence Bank, 29 U.S. at 562.
259. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
260. Id. at 636.
261. Pembina Consol., 125 U.S. at 187.
262. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193
(1992).
263. According to Professor Akhil Amar, in Spies v. Illinois, John Randolph Tucker had argued to the
U.S. Supreme Court,
Though originally the first ten Amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in
so far as they secure and recognize fundamental rights-common law rights-of the man, they
make them privileges and immunities of the man as citizen of the United States, and [those privi-
leges] cannot now be abridged by a State under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, while
the ten Amendments, as limitations on power, only apply to the Federal govermment, and not to the
States, yet in so far as they declare or recognize rights of persons, these rights are theirs, as citi-
zens of the United States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits state power ....
Id. at 1270-71. Amar noted that Justice Field embraced Tucker's argument five years later when he wrote,
" '[A]fter much reflection I think the definition given at one time before this court by a distinguished advo-
cate-Mr. John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia-is correct.' " Id. at 1271.
264. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
265. Id. at 28.
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claimed that the Court had "so held" 266 in Santa Clara, he probably did not
mean to imply that the Court had interpreted corporations as having all the
rights of natural persons.
Justice Black eventually challenged the idea that the corporation is a per-
son in his dissenting opinion in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v.
Johnson,267 in which he bluntly stated, "I do not believe the word 'person' in
the Fourteenth Amendment includes corporations." 268 Justice Black, how-
ever, like Justice Field many years before him also erroneously believed that
the Court had held otherwise in Santa Clara. The U.S. Supreme Court did
270
not discuss the issue again until Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander in 1949.
In that case, Justice Jackson also erroneously interpreted Santa Clara.271 He
was of the opinion that the Court had consistently held that the corporation is
a person since Santa Clara.272 In the dissenting opinion, however, Justice
Douglas wrote a scathing criticism of the majority's interpretation of Santa
Clara, and although he absurdly attributed court reporter Davis' wording in
the headnote to Chief Justice Waite, he observed that "[t]here was no history,
logic, or reason given to support that view." 273 That is correct because the
Court did not actually express that view in that case.
The U.S. Supreme Court's early pronouncements on the legal status of
the corporation emerge upon careful scrutiny as a comedy of errors. It is
clear, however, that, regardless of whether the corporation was a person with-
in the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury corporations did not have all of the constitutional rights of natural per-
sons, and they certainly did not have the constitutional right to engage in
274
speech or to make political contributions. In McConnell v. Combination
Mining & Milling Co.,275 for instance, the Supreme Court of Montana ruled
that the mining company's political expenditures, including lobbying ex-
penses, were ultra vires because the statute under which it was incorporated
did not authorize the creation of corporations for political purposes. In
277People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss in 1907, in the direct wake of the insurance
scandals, the Court of Appeals of New York held that while the political con-
tributions of the insurance company were not crimes, they were "foreign to
266. Id.
267. 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
268. Id. at 85.
269. Id. at 87.
270. 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
271. Id. at 574.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 577.
274. They did have some Bill of Rights protections against the federal government. They received some
protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as early as 1893. Carl J. Mayer, Personal-
izing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 590-91 (1990).
275. 76 P. 194 (Mont. 1904).
276. Id. at 199.
277. 80 N.E. 383 (N.Y. 1907).
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the chartered purposes of the corporation."
278
Neither of these cases, however, raised any Fourteenth Amendment is-
279
sues. It was not until Michigan v. Gansley that a corporation attempted to
use its status as a legal person under the Fourteenth Amendment to nullify a
state statute. The corporation had made political expenditures in violation of
a state statute and it challenged the statute, arguing that it had a right to do so
by virtue of being a person under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court rejected the argument on the grounds that the expenditure
of monies for political purposes could not be "deemed to be a property right
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment" because corporations had
no rights to make political expenditures under Michigan's incorporation stat-
ute, nor were they deprived of any of their other rights or privileges under the
statute under which they were created.281 The Court noted that the corpora-
tion-the Lansing Brewing Co.-was created for the purpose of manufactur-
ing beer and that the state legislature probably sought to prohibit corporations
from using their funds to influence elections when it enacted the statute under
challenge. 82 In the Court's view, the state legislature acted within its powers
when it sought to prohibit political expenditures by a corporation that was
created under state law to make beer.2 83
Gansley, however, did not directly raise any First Amendment issues. At
the time the Michigan Supreme Court handed down its decision in Michigan
v. Gansley, the First Amendment did not apply to the states. Gitlow v. New
York284 in 1925 was the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to incorporate the
First Amendment. In Gitlow, the Court actually incorporated the First
Amendment under the Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges and Im-
285
munities Clause as some, such as Justice Field, might have expected. This
later made the Court's almost fortuitous definition of the corporation as a le-
gal person a central issue in the debate about the scope of corporations' right
to speech. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, however, there
were clearly no federal constitutional constraints on the states' regulation of
any forms of speech, corporate or otherwise.
Moreover, until well into the twentieth century, there were no federal
constitutional protections for commercial speech, whether by corporations or
natural persons.286 The Court, in fact, still interprets the First Amendment to
278. Id. at 387.
279. 158 N.W. 195 (Mich. 1916).
280. Id. at 196.
281. Id. at 200.
282. Id. at 201.
283. Id.
284. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
285. Id. at 666.
286. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), the Court stated, "We are... clear that the
Constitution imposes no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." The Court
did not clearly reject Valentine's sweeping statement of a commercial speech exception to the First Amend-
ment right to free speech until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). The Court acknowledged in Virginia State Board, however, that "[tihere can
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provide less protection for commercial speech than for political speech. 287
Thus, there were no real federal constitutional restrictions on the federal or
state governments' regulation of corporate advertising or any other forms of
corporate communications intended to promote the sale of their products until
after the middle of the century. The Court did not hold that First Amendment
protections apply to corporate political speech, either, until First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti in 1978. Bellotti arose from a challenge to a fed-
eral statute that prohibited corporations from making political expendi-
289tures. Some state governments had enacted similar statutes as early as the
turn of the century. It is a simple fact that for most of the twentieth century
there were no federal constitutional restraints on the power of either the fed-
eral or state governments to limit corporate speech. There were no state con-
stitutional restraints either.
At the turn of the twentieth century, courts had not yet fully elaborated
on the legal definition of speech. It was not yet clear, for instance, that politi-
cal expenditures were a form of political speech, or that there was a legal dis-
tinction between political speech and commercial speech.291 What is perhaps
most significant about the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, is that
neither the federal nor state legislatures implemented more sweeping prohibi-
tions on corporate speech. Most of the statutes directed at what today would
be considered corporate political speech only prohibited corporations from
making direct campaign contributions.292 Corporations were generally free to
influence political outcomes indirectly, and there were no restrictions on di-
rect campaign contributions from corporate directors or executives acting in
their personal capacities.293 This allowed corporations to find ways of cir-
cumventing the restrictions on their direct contributions. Moreover, there
be no question that in past decisions the Court has given some indication that commercial speech is unpro-
tected." Id. at 758.
287. Id. at 762. As a general matter, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as speech
that is intended to "propose a commercial transaction." Id. at 760.
288. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Some caution is in order in stating what the Court held in Bellotti. Justice
Powell, in delivering the opinion of the Court, wrote:
The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and to what extent corpora-
tions have First Amendment rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The
First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper question therefore
is not whether corporations "have" First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coexten-
sive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the Massachusetts stat-
ute in question] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that
it does.
Id. at 775-76. Thus, in Bellotti, the Court held that the First Amendment applies to corporations but not that
corporations have First Amendment rights.
289. Id.
290. Adam Winkler, McConnell v. FEC, Corporate Political Speech, and the Legacy of the Segregated
Fund Cases, 3 ELECTION L.J. 361, 362 (2004).
291. The U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that political expenditures are a form of speech until Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1976). The Court drew the distinction in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,
54(1942).
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were no restrictions on corporations' commercial speech, even though some
commercial speech clearly was intended to serve political goals.2 94
C. The Short and Dull Life of the Ultra Vires Doctrine
There were, of course, many other ways in which corporations could in-
fluence political outcomes. Corporations did not initially have the wisdom to
use their freedoms to take advantage of many of the opportunities. But given
their growing concerns about public attitudes, corporate leaders began to rec-
ognize the importance of public opinion and to think of ways of refurbishing
their corporations' tarnished reputations.295 One of the most important ways
in which corporations attempted to redress the poor regard in which they were
held was by investing in public relations.296 Broadly construed, their public
relations efforts involved conscious attempts to influence public opinion
through the media, charitable or philanthropic donations, and even internal
bureaucratic forms of corporate welfare. Although the federal and state gov-
ernments could have regulated all of these kinds of public relations activities,
they did not. In some important cases, shareholders of the corporations ob-
jected to the use of corporate funds for such purposes.297 This led to some
early shareholder derivative suits challenging the activities under the ultra vir-
es doctrine.
In these suits, courts did apply the ultra vires doctrine to restrain corpo-
rate directors from expending corporate funds for purposes that were not nar-
rowly within the scope of their charters. In McConnell v. Combination Min-
ing & Milling Co., for example, the Supreme Court of Montana held that
donations by a corporation for "strictly political purposes" were ultra vires
because the statute under which the corporation was created did not enumer-
ate any political purposes.298 As a general matter, though, courts were in-
clined to construe the scope of corporate charters broadly. In Hawes v. City of
Oakland,299 for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a suit by a share-
holder who sought to restrain a corporation, the Contra Costa Waterworks
Company, from giving free water to the city of Oakland on the grounds that
the company's charter did not forbid such gifts.300 As the Court explained,
the city had the power to confer valuable franchise rights on the company, and
,301it may have been "the highest wisdom to let the city use the water. . . ."
294. See infra Part IV.G.
295. See generally STUART EWEN, PR! A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN (1996); MARCHAND, supra note 236.
296. See generally EWEN, supra note 295; MARCHAND, supra note 236.
297. Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 879 (2004). Winkler argues that it was primarily these objections, rather than the
public's concerns about corporate political power, that drove early campaign finance laws. Id at 873.
298. 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904).
299. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
300. Id. at 461.
301. Id. at 462.
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And in Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,302 the New York Supreme Court held
that "the very moderate expenditures or contributions of the company towards
church, school, library, and baths" for its employees and their families were
not ultra vires.3 03 As the court explained, "taken as a whole" the expenditures
were "directly related to the legitimate objects of the corporation."
In these early cases, the courts were foreshadowing the contours of the
business judgment rule. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,305 which is often cited as
one of the earliest precedents for the business judgment rule, also involved a
challenge to the use of corporate funds for purportedly philanthropic pur-
poses. The Dodge brothers, who were minority shareholders in Ford Mo-
tor Company, challenged the directors' decision to use the corporation's earn-
ings for new investments instead of additional dividends. 307 Henry Ford, the
majority shareholder and president of the company, explained his strategy was
"to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes."30 8 The Michigan Supreme Court asserted that a "business corpora-
tion is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders"
and "[t]he discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself."309 It af-
firmed the lower court's decree ordering a dividend payment but reaffirmed
its previous deference to the discretion of a corporation's directors by quoting
from an earlier opinion:
Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of the directors unless it is
clearly made to appear that they are guilty of fraud or misappropriation of the
corporate funds, or refuse to declare a dividend when [it] would amount to such
an abuse of discretion as would constitute a fraud, or breach of that good faith
which they are bound to exercise towards the stockholders. 310
As corporate law developed further in the twentieth century, the business
judgment rule was more clearly articulated and refined, and the ultra vires
doctrine receded into virtual insignificance. 311
D. The Genesis of Corporate Public Relations
Even in the early twentieth century, therefore, there were no important
legal impediments to corporations' attempts to use public relations campaigns
302. 40 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896).
303. Id at 721.
304. Id.
305. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
306. Id at 683-84.
307. Id. at 683.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 684.
310. Id. at 682.
311. The modem business judgment rule was stated concisely in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984), in which the Delaware Supreme Court explained: "It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Id.
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to sway public opinions and attitudes. The modem public relations industry
emerged when corporations discovered that expenditures on public relations
provided a profitable return on investment. 312 As the twentieth century pro-
ceeded, corporations expended increasing amounts of resources in efforts to
improve both the general public's and their own employees' attitudes toward
them. 313 The power of corporate public relations and its impact on American
politics, law, and society is difficult to assess. Some radical scholars, such as
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, believe that it has facilitated a kind of
corporate hegemony, in which corporate leaders are able to "manufacture
consent" for corporate avarice and misdeeds.314 In truth, there is little evi-
dence upon which to sustain such an extreme view. Nonetheless, even more
moderate scholars, who have recognized important limits on the efficacy of
corporate public relations programs and have argued that they necessarily
have had much more modest goals, have attributed to them great success.31s
There is little question that corporations' initial efforts to influence pub-
lic opinion were a direct response to the Progressive Movement and related
public ressures for restraints on the "trusts" at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. 31 The Robber Barons, the Second Industrial Revolution, the Great
Merger Movement, and myriad articles and stories in the newspapers, maga-
zines, and even novels had contributed to a growing perception that the corpo-
ration was evil and that it was beginning to control not only the economy but
government. As Roland Marchand explained:
[A]s major corporations expanded at a bewildering pace at the end of the nine-
teenth century, the notion of corporate powerlessness became untenable. Many
companies, through mergers and other forms of vertical integration and horizon-
tal consolidation, so dominated their industries that they now controlled their
market as much as they were ruled by it. And they threatened to control much
more than that. The pure size of many corporations-their number of employ-
ees, the magnitude of their production, their capital resources, their national
scope in distribution, and their capacity for political influence-persuaded many
Americans ... that the nexus of social institutions within which they lived had
been radically transformed. The traditional potency of the family, the church
and the local community suddenly seemed dwarfed by the sway of the giant
corporations. This momentous shift in the balance of social forces created a cri-
sis of legitimacy for the large corporations.3 17
Initially, most corporations responded to their poor public images with
public relations programs directed at their immediate political and marketing
objectives.318 Their public relations efforts thus attempted to "provide factual
arguments and, at times, palpable actions that would answer antibusiness ar-
guments and enunciate a commonality between the private enterprise system
312. See generally EWEN, supra note 295; MARCHAND, supra note 236.
313. See generally EWEN, supra note 295; MARCHAND, supra note 236.
314. See generally EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988).
315. See, e.g., MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 362.
316. Id. at 2-4.
317. Id. at 2.
318. Id. at 4.
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and the public interest." 319 But they soon recognized the need for more than
factual arguments and philosophical defenses of free markets. Critics of the
corporations and big business at the turn of the twentieth century frequently
spoke and wrote of the corporation as having no soul.320 People recognized
that the corporation had the legal status of a person, for many purposes, but
they emphasized that it was an artificial person, created for the exclusive pur-
pose of making profits, rather than a natural person with all the moral attrib-
utes of a human being. Thus, "in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, both advocates and critics of the giant corporation spoke of [public
relations efforts] as quests for a corporate soul." 321
Corporate public relations efforts in the early twentieth century were
aided by changes in the way people acquired information. Many of the same
changes that were transforming the nexus of social institutions within which
people lived-the relative demise in importance of the church and local com-
munity, for instance-also were changing patterns of communication. 322
People began to depend less on their personal and local contacts as sources of
information and more on newspapers and magazines, which, by the turn of the
twentieth century, had circulations that were enormous by nineteenth century
323
standards. Ironically, the success of the muckrakers had been a product of
the new power of the media. But people had read the muckraking articles
more like spectators and less like participants. As Stuart Ewen explained:
Behind the sensationalization of Progressive publicity lay signs that the public
had changed in consequential ways. If the public had once been active in shap-
ing the political life and social intercourse of the nation, the new public was de-
fined increasingly by its vulnerable condition of isolation and spectatorship.
Readers of mass-circulation newspapers and magazines were witnesses to soci-
ety, no longer within the public square but from the sanctuary of their par-
lors.324
E. The Corporate Control of the Media
Not only were people becoming more reliant on newspapers and maga-
zines for information and acculturation, the newspapers and magazines were
becoming increasingly dependent on corporate advertising revenues.325 As in
the manufacturing industries, the media industries also had invested in new
machinery and equipment around the turn of the twentieth century.326 Print-
ing became much more capital intensive and required much larger invest-
327
ments. At the same time, with improved transportation, the potential
319. EWEN, supra note 295, at 401.
-320. MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 7.
321. Id. at 4.
322. Id. at 2.
323. See EWEN, supra note 295, at 53, 59.
324. Id. at 59.
325. Id. at 53.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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circulation of the newspapers and magazines was vastly greater.328 They
needed to earn more revenues to make a return on their heavy capital invest-
ments, so they actively sought to increase their circulations, usually by charg-
ing low prices.329 The increase in their circulations made advertising in the
newspapers and magazines more effective because it reached a much wider
audience. Thus, the newspapers and magazines could charge higher rates for
advertising space the more they increased their circulations.
The newspapers quickly became much more dependent on advertising
revenues than on their newsstand prices for their profits.330 Competition only
tended to force newsstand prices even lower. Because their circulations were
centrally important to their advertising revenues, they generally stood ready to
match any competitors' price cuts. At the same time, readership of newspa-
pers was increasing dramatically so that, even though their individual circula-
tions were growing, so were the number of newspapers overall. 331 By the late
nineteenth century, the newspaper industry was big business. As Frank Lu-
ther Mott described, "[i]n circulations, in the number of pages per issue, and
in volume of advertising, the great newspapers grew to sizes scarcely dreamed
of before, while figures representing investments, costs, and revenues reached
astonishing totals."3 32 At a time when people were becoming more depend-
ent on newspapers for information about the world around them, the newspa-
per industry was changing so that more and more people received their infor-
mation from the same sources.
The economic incentives and imperatives that transformed the newspa-
per industry also transformed the magazine industry. Beginnin in the 1890s,
mass-circulation magazines began reaching national audiences. They had
unprecedented circulations. As Ewen explained:
Starting with McClure's and Munsey's Magazine-then Hampton's, Every-
body's, Colliers, Cosmopolitan, Scribner's, and The American Magazine-a
new generation of magazines began to emerge. With cover prices of ten to fif-
teen cents, circulations grew exponentially. If 50,000 people was considered an
enormous readership prior to 1890, between 1900 and 1912, some magazine
circulations soared to 1 million. 334
The developments in the magazine industry thus reinforced the trends es-
tablished by the newspaper industry. People were more dependent on the me-
dia than ever before, but, because of the huge circulations of the newspapers
and magazines, more Americans were dependent on identical information
sources.
328. Id
329. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 190-91. The same economic forces were evident at the same
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The changes in the media industries presented corporations with new
opportunities for managing their public images. First of all, they were able to
have some influence over the issues the media chose to address as well as
how the media addressed them. Newspapers and magazines that published
articles critical of specific corporations, or even business generally, might ex-
pect to lose an important source of advertising revenues. 335  Ironically, the
growth of the newspapers and magazines had initially encouraged the wave of
muckraking journalism around the turn of the twentieth century.336 The
newspapers and magazines were in the business of making profits, and sensa-
tionalist expos6s of corporate transgressions helped them to sell their newspa-
pers.337 Most of the media magnates had little concern for what they pub-
lished, so long as it helped their newspapers and magazines earn a good
profit. But they eventually learned that some kinds of articles might hurt
their bottom line even if they did sell the newspapers. As Richard Hofstadter
explained:
Advertisers did not hesitate to withdraw orders for space when their own inter-
ests or related interests were touched upon. Bankers adopted a discriminatory
credit policy, so that modest loans could not be secured even for the mainte-
nance of a business of great value and proved stability.339
The dependence of the newspapers and magazines on corporate advertis-
ing expenditures, and the implicit threat of advertising boycotts, probably
helped to filter out of the media many articles and editorials that would have
been critical of big business, especially when newspapers and magazines be-
gan to be absorbed into large media chains, and the media were further drawn
340into the corporate web themselves after the turn of the century. Some radi-
cal scholars have emphasized the corporate filter on the news in their critiques
of corporate capitalism. For instance, Berman and Chomsky list the concen-
tration and dominance of the media industries and the fact that their primary
revenue source is corporate advertising revenues number one and two on their
summary of the five essential ingredients in their "propaganda model." 34 1
They list "flak" as a means of disciplining the media number four.34 2  It is
difficult to evaluate how much the implicit threat of corporate advertising
boycotts has shaped the news, but it is clear that American corporations at the
turn of the twentieth century did not rely exclusively, or even primarily, on
335. HOFSTADTER, supra note 24, at 194.
336. Id. at 186-87.
337. Id. at 188.
338. Hofstadter describes the muckraking journalism that was popular at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury as "more or less accident[al]." Id. at 193.
339. Id. at 194.
340. According to Stuart Ewen, the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1920s saw
"momentous expansion and consolidation of media industries." EWEN, supra note 295, at 176. Moreover,
"[t]he impact ... was considerable .... [A] society once defined by its remarkable variety of cultural back-
grounds... was being melded into generic ways of seeing, shaped by the priorities of modern commercial
enterprise." Id.
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their power to censor the news to achieve their public relations objectives.
They were far more proactive.
F. The Birth of Corporate Publicity Campaigns
Beginning in the early 1900s, a small number of corporations hired pub-
lic relations experts to initiate and coordinate systematic efforts to improve
their companies' images.343 It was then that the public relations profession
emerged. Ironically, the first public relations experts were usually former
journalists who knew how the news was collected and reported and could use
their inside knowledge to help their clients influence what was written. 34
They were typically hired when a large corporation was in the throes of a pub-
lic relations crisis. Ivy Lee, for instance, arguably the first American public
relations manager was hired by a group of coal companies in 1906 in antici-
pation of a strike. 45 The coal miners' union leaders had cultivated strong re-
lationships with the press during a previous strike in 1902, and they had been
able to rally public opinion to their cause and win many of their demands.34 6
347This time the companies were determined not to let that happen again. Lee
previously worked as a journalist and knew how to curry their favor. In con-
trast to the policy the coal companies adopted during the previous strike, he
chose to be more open with the press, although he was careful to make sure
348that he was always the conduit for any communications. His efforts were
349
successful, and the coal companies received more favorable coverage.
One of the first major corporations to establish an in-house public rela-
tions department was AT&T. In the first decade of the twentieth century,
AT&T was aggressively ursuing a strategy to dominate the national market
for telephone services. AT&T's strategy was based on pricing below
costs, building its network ahead of demand, and encouraging local govern-
ments to grant exclusive franchises. 351 Needless to say, their efforts drew in-
tense criticism from the independent telephone companies and raised signifi-
cant suspicions among the general public.352 AT&T was particularly
concerned about the trend at the time towards public ownership and control of
the telephone industry in some Canadian provinces and most European na-
tions. 35 AT&T began a public relations program just after the turn of the
343. EWEN, supra note 295, at 77.
344. Id. at 76.
345. Id at 77.
346. Id. at 76.
347. Id. at 76-77.
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twentieth century, but it was not especially ambitious. 354
After a financial panic in 1907 that almost drove the company bankrupt,
AT&T significantly expanded its public relations efforts. 355 AT&T's new
president, David Vail, recognized that the company's objective of achieving
national domination faced serious public opposition but felt that a systematic
program of public relations could convince the public of the virtues of a pri-
356
vate, national monopoly. In a series of breakthrough advertisements that
were characterized by the industry journal, Printer's Ink, as a "new way to
lobby," AT&T condemned the wastefulness of "telephone duplication" and
received supportive editorials from a number of major newspapers. An
AT&T report afterwards concluded that the effort "indicated the possibilities
of a broad policy of publicity."35 8
AT&T committed itself to building a new public image and proceeded to
experiment with new public relations techniques.359 It hired one of the na-
tion's first advertising agencies, N.W. Ayer & Son, to devise a national adver-
tising campaign. Ayer changed the tone of AT&T ads.360 Where the ads
formerly had been didactic, and even defensive, Ayer's ads were stirring and
inspirational. They glorified AT&T's role in the advancement of human civi-
361lization and promoting national unity and interpersonal connections. One
of Ayer's strategies was to launch a continuous stream of ads, from one
month to the next, and make them attractive so that people would actually an-
ticipate them, perhaps even with some eagerness. AT&T encouraged its
associated Bell companies to adopt the same advertising policies and sought
363to coordinate the advertising campaigns nationally.
In spite of its public relations efforts, though, AT&T still feared regula-
tion.364 Instead of attempting to fight what may have been inevitable, AT&T
moderated its strategy. Rather than seeking national dominance as a stand-
alone company, it sought to position itself at the center of a national network
365in support of its Bell associates with regional monopolies. Despite all its
early public relations successes, AT&T nonetheless realized that it could not
control public opinion and political pressures completely. Instead, it sought to
influence how the regulatory regime in the telephone industry was devel-
366
oped. It lobbied to ensure that regulations would be implemented by state
legislatures so that it would be regulated by state telephone commissions
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rather than federal agencies.367 Regulation by state commissions enabled
AT&T to have more ongoing influence with the regulators. The AT&T story
thus reflects not only the power of corporate publicity campaigns to influence
public opinion and legislation but also the limitations on corporations' abili-
ties to control their political environments.
G. Public Relations Humanizes the Corporation
Other corporations soon recognized that they also could use public rela-
tions to good ends and jumped on the bandwagon.368 An infant public rela-
tions industry was born, and a new breed of public relations professionals who
developed the precepts of modern public relations campaigns emerged. 369
These public relations pioneers often knew that they were not only manipulat-
ing public opinion but changing the nature of democracy-they saw that not
only as their objective but as a responsibility. Edward Bernays, for instance,
who helped to engineer the U.S. government's public relations campaign dur-
ing World War I, wrote:
The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions
of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who ma-
nipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government
which is the true ruling power of our country. 370
Bernays was not alone in recognizing the tremendous power of public
relations or the role it would play in modern life. As Walter Lippmann wrote:
The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one that was supposed
to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It
has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analy-
sis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research,
coupled with modem means of communication, the practice of democracy has
turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than
any shifting of economic power.37
The new public relations experts quickly surmised that it was not enough
to simply sell their corporations' products-they needed to humanize the cor-
porations. When people spoke at the turn of the twentieth century of the cor-
poration having "no pants to kick and no soul to damn," they were making a
point about the impersonality of the corporation and its lack of moral integrity
367. Id.
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and sense of social responsibility. 372 As Seth Low explained in 1898:
The impersonality of the corporation lends itself readily to many abuses from
which the sense of personal responsibility saves individual men .... The fun-
damental evil in the corporate form of management, undoubtedly, is the loss of
personal responsibility. It is a common remark that as directors men will do
things which as individuals they would not think of doing. Indeed, the evil lies
deeper than this. Because they are directors, and therefore, as they say, trustees
for others, they feel constrained to do for the benefit of the stockholders what as
individuals they abhor. m
Thus, large corporations increasingly sought to give themselves a human
face. While AT&T's early ads emphasized the efficiency and social utility of
a national telephone network, later ads tended to display a more human, and
frequently feminine, face.374 Other corporations followed suit.375 Some cor-
porations, such as National Cash Register and Western Electric, began to em-
phasize the people behind their companies.376 Many corporations produced
ads that projected warm images of wholesome communities and suggested
that they too, somehow, were their customers' neighbors within these com-
munities. 377 Some corporations produced ads that tried to project images of
their stockholders, usually as ordinary, middle-class Americans, sometimes
bordering on the absurd.378 Many companies also recognized that their em-
ployees were an important audience for their ads, not only because they were
concerned about employee morale and labor relations but also because they
knew that their employees were an important and growing part of the general
public. Thus, some corporations established company magazines and pro-
duced ads for these magazines or other publications that depicted happy em-
ployees leaving their factories or returning home from a hard day at work.37 9
People were not mindless and they never came to think of corporations
as human or anything other than business entities. The sophisticated profes-
sionals who came to manage their public relations campaigns knew people
were not that mindless, so they set much more realistic objectives. The
372. See supra note 22.
373. Seth Low, The Trend of the Century, 490 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 153, 160 (1898).
374. See, e.g., MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 64-65 ("The Spirit of Service" ad showing a brave line-
man fixing a downed line in a ferocious storm; "Weavers of Speech" ad showing an attractive young woman
earnestly connecting callers at a switchboard).
375. See, e.g., id. at 171, 195 (Heinz ad, "The Homelike Kitchens of Heinz," showing a woman in apron
carrying food in a bowl in a domestic-looking setting; Du Pont ad, "today's Prometheus," showing a bespec-
tacled man in an apron examining a test tube).
376. See, e.g., id. at 106, 112 ("The people and plant that stand behind every National Cash Register";
Western Electric ad "Some of the 37,000 workers in the world's telephone workshop").
377. See, e.g., id. at 85, 155, 243 (AT&T ad "Friend and Neighbor"; General Electric ad "The initials of
a friend"; General Motors ad "Home Address, Main Street, U.S.A.").
378. See, e.g., id. at 76, 78 (AT&T ad, "Our Stockholders," showing a young woman with two children
at her sides; Bell Telephone ad, "She's a Partner in a Great American Business," illustrating a smiling,
grandmotherly woman preparing a meal at a table).
379. See, e.g., id at 228, 238, 240 (cover of US. Steel News for July 1940, showing a blue-collar em-
ployee returning from work to a scene of domestic tranquility; General Motors ad, "What Happens to General
Motors Happens to Me!"; cover of GM Folks from October 1938, showing three happy blue-collar workers
leaving a plant).
380. As Earl Newsom, who worked for Standard Oil, explained at a public relations conference in 1946:
The clear, noteworthy image thrown upon the screen must be one of portraying our company as
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relentless onslaught of favorable corporate imagery, however, did change
public attitudes. People became much more accepting of the role of the cor-
poration in American society and much less cynical about its character. As
Roland Marchand explained:
[T]he giant corporation, arising after the mid-nineteenth century, demolished all
balance in size and power between the framers of the new corporate images and
their audiences. Over time a cadre of those most talented in devising verbal and
visual imagery came to dominate such discourse on behalf of the largest, richest
organizations. Although individuals, and occasionally those united in voluntary
groups, did not lack all capacity to counter or even undercut the flood of im-
agery from the corporations, the encounters became increasingly disproportion-
ate as the twentieth century wore on. The citizen incessantly addressed as fa-
vorite, friend, neighbor, and even family member of the corporation had to
develop a prickly, discriminatory wariness in order to resist acquiescence and
maintain a realistic sense of conflicting interests.38 1
H. The Ideology of Corporate Capitalism
Beyond humanizing the corporation, some of the public relations efforts
were devoted to rationalizing the market system in which the corporations
thrived, presumably to forestall new regulations. Some corporations both
supported the war effort and took advantage of the ogortunity to propagate
the ideology of the free market during World War II. Some of these ads,
and others, were overtly ideological. General Motors, for instance, in an ad
titled, "Know-How," proclaimed that although "[t]hey said that America was
unprepared for war[,] . . . [t]hey forgot that in America free enterprise had for
years been encouraging-stimulating-urging men to leam how to make
things better and better-in greater volume-at constantly lower costs."383
Republic Steel, in an ad titled, "Boys, I'll tell you what Free Enterprise really
is!" used the image of a professional middle-aged man speaking to a group of
other men in a shop around a wood stove to describe and praise free enter-
prise.384 As the narrator explained:
[I]t's our right to live our own lives, run our own jobs and our own businesses
in our own way-without needless interference . . . to criticize the government,
bawl out the umpire . .. make a speech on the public square .... It offers
wanting the things that people want. There must be a merging of image and audience if people are
to say "That is my kind of company-that is good-let us keep and preserve and extend that insti-
tution." The image cannot be one of human exploitation, of ruthlessness, of greed, of selfishness.
The image must be a human image. For it must reveal a company as an organization of human be-
ings. For, you see, we are asking people to "join our crowd"-they who want so much to join a
crowd.
EWEN, supra note 295, at 380.
381. MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 362.
382. See, e.g., id. at 325, 327, 329 (Republic Steel ad, "Leatherneck Joe Mechanic," in which "Joe,"
writing from a marine's perspective, noted that the "radical stuff... always hits us little guys the hardest";
General Motors ad, "Victory is Our Business," that refered to GM as "partners in production" with farmers in
the war effort; Du Pont ad, "Soldiers of the Soil," honoring farmers and showing empathy for those who
made sacrifices for the war without receiving any public recognition).
383. Id. at 337.
384. Id. at 352.
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opportuni to anyone who really wants it. It rewards thrift, hard work and in-
genuity.
The ad ends in rousing fashion when the narrator proclaims, "Frankly, I
don't like the name Free Enterprise . . . . I'd rather call it American Enter-
prise, because it's the most American thing we have .... Let's keep it." 386
The irony, of course, is that a large corporation-the kind of institution
that many progressive reformers worried was a threat to American society be-
cause it would destroy democracy and replace it with plutocracy-was now
equating free enterprise, an economic system in which the corporation
thrived, with democracy and all things American. The fact that Republic
Steel could even think of publishing such an ad was itself testimony to the
dramatic change in public attitudes during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. As Lippmann explained earlier in the century, the corporation had suc-
ceeded in embedding a corporate ideology into the public mind in part by us-
ing the precepts of neoclassical economic theory to rationalize and legitimize
the way that corporate capitalism worked. He began by elegantly describing
neoclassical economic theory:
[The older economists] set out to describe the social system under which they
lived, and found it too complicated for words. So they constructed what they
sincerely hoped was a simplified diagram, not so different in principle and in
veracity from the parallelogram with legs and head in a child's drawing of a
complicated cow. The scheme consisted of a capitalist who had diligently
saved capital from his labor, an entrepreneur who conceived a socially useful
demand and organized a factory, a collection of workmen who freely con-
tracted, take it or leave it, for their labor, a landlord, and a group of consumers
who bought in the cheapest market those goods which by the ready use of the
pleasure-pain calculus they knew would give them the most pleasure.38 7
He then explained how this positive theory of a private exchange econ-
omy was used to provide a normative justification of the free market system:
The kind of people, which the model assumed, living in the sort of world the
model assumed, invariably cooperated [sic] harmoniously in the books where
the model was described. With modification and embroidery, this pure fiction,
used by economists to simplify their thinking, was retailed and popularized until
for large sections of the population it prevailed as the economic mythology of
the day .... The buildings which rose, and the bank accounts which accumu-
lated, were evidence that the stereotype of how the thing had been done was ac-
curate. And those who benefited most b success came to believe they were the
kind of men they were supposed to be.
I. Corporate Welfare Work
It is notable that so many corporations targeted some part of their public
relations directly at their own employees. Labor relations were often strained,
385. Id.
386. Id
387. LIPPMAN, supra note 371, at 117.
388. Id.at 117-18.
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and this was one way of improving employee morale and loyalty. The Pro-
gressive Movement motivated many corporations to go beyond their rhetoric
and implement in-house programs for their employees' moral and spiritual
edification and general welfare.3 89  At the time, these programs often were
referred to as "welfare work."390 Sanford Jacoby traces the origins of welfare
capitalism to three influences on some larger corporations that began in the
late nineteenth century.391 First, there was the scientific management move-
ment that sought to systematize and rationalize corporations' production proc-
esses and administrative practices.392 Second, there was a movement to es-
tablish programs for the employees' direct benefit, such as worker
compensation schemes, savings plans, and even some educational and recrea-
tional programs.393 Third, there was a movement among social workers to
establish vocational guidance programs, particularly to improve young peo-
ples' integration into the labor market.
These separate influences ultimately merged into the personnel man-
agement movement. Although the personnel management movement only
had any widespread influence beginning in the 191 Os, some corporations were
at the forefront of welfare work long before then.395 As early as 1882, for in-
stance, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company provided hospital and nursing
services for its employees.396 In the 1890s, it established kindergartens for its
employees' young children, as well as reading rooms and music and recrea-
tional programs for its employees themselves. The National Cash Register
Company was probably the first large cor oration to experiment with corpo-
rate welfare programs in the early 1900s. It established a "Labor Depart-
ment" in 1901. Other major corporations followed suit, and by 1908, one
contemporary observed that one and a half million workers in the United
400States were covered by at least some kind of corporate welfare program.
Although welfare capitalism was never prevalent in the United States, well-
known corporations such as Eastman Kodak, U.S. Steel, General Electric, and
International Harvester, all had corporate welfare programs in the early twen-
tieth century. 401
There was a spike in interest in corporate welfare programs in the late
389. See generally JACOBY, supra note 113; MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 15-26; Edward Berkowitz
& Kim McQuaid, Businessman and Bureaucrat: The Evolution of the American Social Welfare System, 1900-
1940, 38 J. ECON. HIsT. 120 (1978).
390. MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 16.
391. JACOBY, supra note 113, at 39-73.
392. Id. at 40-44.
393. Id. at 48-74.
394. Id. at 66-74.
395. MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 16.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Berkowitz & McQuaid, supra note 389, at 123.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
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1910s, especially during and immediately after World War I, when there was
a labor shortage and labor relations deteriorated.402 Many corporations dur-
ing the period from 1915 to 1920 first established personnel departments. 403
Although the personnel managers often hoped to implement sweeping new
programs and reform labor management practices, they rarely succeeded.404
Their companies typically had little interest in welfare work that was not di-
rected at improving the bottom line.405 After the war, there was a period of
sustained prosperity, and labor relations were relatively good. The personnel
management movement was no longer a high priority. Nonetheless, many
corporations did implement significant corporate welfare programs during the
first two or three decades of the twentieth century. These proved to have sub-
tle, but possibly important, consequences.
Of course, in many cases corporate welfare programs helped to improve
labor relations. They improved employee morale and loyalty, reduced em-
ployee turnover and related costs, and they may have contributed to labor
productivity through an efficiency-wage incentive-an incentive for workers
to maintain high productivity so as to ensure they kept their good jobs with
good wages and benefits. But they probably also had important political
consequences. First, they improved corporations' images with their own em-
ployees, and because the corporate sector was growing in size relative to the
rest of the economy, corporate employees became a sizable part of the general
408public. Beyond that, however, the fact that the corporate welfare programs
existed, and in the forms that they took within the private sector, may have
influenced the way some public welfare programs developed, or, as may have
been the case, did not develop. Indeed, corporate leaders sometimes had
adopted their own welfare programs to preempt overnment programs and
they subsequently resisted "statist 'interference.' "
The structure of some government welfare programs also may have been
influenced by the corporate welfare precedents. Edward Berkowitz and Kim
McQuaid, for instance, contend that when the social security system was im-
plemented, corporate leaders were extensively consulted, and the system that
was adopted was modeled, in some ways, on similar corporate welfare
410plans. For example, the social security scheme was devised so that social
security benefits would be paid only to those who had been employed and had
made social security contributions, much like in a private retirement plan.411
402. See generally JACOBY, supra note 113, at 99-123.
403. Id. at 102.
404. Id. at 121-26.
405. See id.
406. See id. at 124-53.
407. See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 200, 200
(1984).
408. See MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 15-16.
409. Berkowitz & McQuaid, supra note 389, at 129.
410. Id. at 133.
411. Id.
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Moreover, the amount of social security benefits someone could receive
would be in some crude proportion to the amount they had contributed, again
much like in a private retirement plan.4 12 And the social securi4 system was
to be financed by contributions and not by general tax revenues.
Finally, the early corporate welfare programs of the Progressive Era laid
the foundations for corporations' modem-day benefits packages, including
private health insurance plans and dental care plans. If corporations had not
offered the benefits, employees may have been more eager to support similar
public plans. Private health and dental benefits have never been treated as
taxable income, and so they provide tax advantages that may benefit employ-
ers and employees.414 If, for instance, the employer paid the employee the
same amount in salary, instead of benefits, the employee would be taxed.
415Presumably, the employer and employee can split the tax savings. Under a
public health insurance program that covered costs directly through general
tax revenues, both employers and employees would stand to lose some of the
tax advantages and possibly face greater tax liabilities to cover the costs of
extendin benefits to those whose tax contributions are too low to cover their
benefits. Whether corporate employees are that calculating or not, the
mere fact that most, if not all, are covered by private benefits plans probably
means there is less political pressure for public plans. In a perverse sense, the
private sector may have "crowd[ed] out" the public sector in the provision of
some kinds of welfare programs and may continue to do so to this day. 417
This crowding out effect, and, for that matter, the efficacy of corporate
public relations programs and corporate welfare work in general, no doubt in-
creased as the corporate sector grew in size and became more concentrated
during the twentieth century. The largest corporations quickly grew to com-
paratively enormous proportions. By the middle of the twentieth century, the
largest 200 corporations accounted for about a third of the value added in
United States manufacturing, and, when ranked by volume of sales, accounted
418for more than a third of all manufacturing employment. By the 1970s, the
largest 200 corporations accounted for more than forty percent of the value
added in United States manufacturing and more than sixty percent of all man-
419
ufacturing employment. Corporations knew that their own employees and
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. This is one of the well-known advantages of nontaxable fringe benefits for employers and their
employees. See generally Ellen O'Brien, Employers' Benefits from Workers' Health Insurance, 81 MILBANK
Q. 5 (2003) (discussing the idea and the literature).
415. Id. at 9-13.
416. O'Brien concludes that, although there are gaps in the literature, there is evidence that private
health insurance plans benefit both employers and their employees. Id. at 29.
417. This reverses the usual way of looking at the relationship between the public and private sector.
See, e.g., M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Public Insurance Expansions and Crowd Out of Private
Coverage, 41 MED. CARE 344, 345 (2003).
418. William N. Leonard, Mergers, Industrial Concentration, and Antitrust Policy, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES
354, 355-56 (1976).
419. Id.
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stockholders were an increasingly important part of the public, and they tar-
geted some of their advertising and public relations efforts at their own stake-
420holders. As the twentieth century progressed, the famous aphorism,
"What's good for General Motors is good for America," became true, in some
part, because it was increasingly true that General Motors was America.
V. CONCLUSION
The rise of the modem corporation was an integral part of the Second
Industrial Revolution. The Second Industrial Revolution would not have oc-
curred if business firms had been unwilling to make the large investments
necessary to implement the important new technologies that drove the indus-
trial growth and development. Business firms may have been reluctant to
make the investments without the shield of limited liability and the ability to
spread their risks across diversified portfolios of corporate stocks. The emer-
gence and growth of the large corporations, however, created significant pub-
lic alarm and led to calls for controls on the corporations. The changes
wrought by the economic and social transformation at the turn of the twenti-
eth century already had disrupted traditional ways of life and contributed to a
growing discontentment across many segments of American society. When
large corporations began to acquire unprecedented economic and political
power, this exacerbated the underlying discontentment and created wide-
spread concerns about the dangers of plutocracy.
There were no federal or state constitutional protections for corporate
speech in the early twentieth century. Although the U.S. Supreme Court stat-
ed that the corporation was a person under the Fourteenth Amendment as far
back as the late nineteenth century, it is clear that the Court at the time did not
intend to extend all of the rights of natural persons to corporations. In any
case, the First Amendment was not incorporated against the states until 1925.
At the turn of the twentieth century, corporations were regarded as creatures
of state law whose powers were defined by their charters under state incorpo-
ration statutes. The federal and state governments could have enacted sweep-
ing regulations on corporations' speech and related corporate behavior. But
they did not. Some forward-thinking corporations took advantage of the op-
portunities and began to redress their poor public images with systematic pub-
lic relations campaigns and welfare work programs that anticipated corpora-
tions' modem benefits plans. The public never came to think of the
corporation as a person or anything other than a business entity. But, by pub-
licizing the people behind the companies and the role that the companies
420. Some of the ads were no doubt motivated to improve employee morale and productivity. See, e.g.,
MARCHAND, supra note 236, at 99 ("Let us put our own House in Order."). Others, however, seem to have
been motivated to indoctrinate the employees with a corporate culture and make them recognize that their
interests coincided with the company's. See id. at 123, 238 ("An Advertisement to Our Employees" and
"What Happens to General Motors Happens to Me!").
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played in the public's day-to-day lives, the public relations campaigns suc-
ceeded in humanizing the corporation and integrating it into the American
public's sense of community. More importantly, perhaps, the public relations
campaigns succeeded in inculcating into the American public an ideology that
rationalized and legitimized the market system within which the corporation
flourished and institutionalized a role for the corporation in the modem econ-
omy.
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United ignited a
firestorm of criticism. In hindsight, this is ironic. Although the scope of cor-
porate speech rights has important political implications, from a historical
perspective, Citizens United merely tinkers at the margins. The larger debate
already has been won by the corporations. Most Americans now accept that
corporations inevitably will play an important role in politics as well as the
economy. If the corporation had not succeeded in gaining widespread social
acceptance, then, for good or ill, it probably would have been subjected to
much more severe legal restrictions. The American economy, as well as
American law and politics, would have developed in fundamentally different
ways. If the courts and legislatures at the turn of the twentieth century had
prevented corporations from engaging in the various kinds of speech and re-
lated behaviors that allowed them to legitimize and institutionalize their role
in American life, they might not have become, in Justice Scalia's words, "the
principal agents of the modem economy." 421
421. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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